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ABSTRACT 
 
 
While organizational status is an important concern in organization and management literature, 
its effect in top executive hiring has not been examined yet. Drawing on the decision-making 
theory of organizations, this research examines top executive hiring as a strategic decision that 
an organization makes when entering relationships with other organizations. It argues that 
organizations are possibly motivated to maintain their existing status and, more importantly, to 
achieve higher status and to avoid lower status. Taking decision-making approach, this research 
theoretically and empirically develops a model of status consciousness that attempts to explain 
under what circumstances status concerns are more or less important for interorganizational 
relation formation decisions. An analysis of presidential hiring in U.S. colleges and universities 
from 1987 to 2006 was used to test the empirical patterns in the maintaining and building of 
organizational status. In so doing, this research makes a case for the effect of organizational 
status in the formation of interorganizational relationships. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
A long-standing tradition in organizational and management research has been to understand the 
phenomena that organizations choose or are chosen to form relationships (e.g. joint ventures, 
strategic alliances, trade associations, interlocking and personnel flows, and so on) with or by 
certain other organizations (Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Granovetter, 1985; 
Oliver, 1990; Whetten, 1981; Van de Ven, 1976). When scholars from different disciplines have 
made extensive accounts of the dynamics of coordination and competition in different forms of 
interorganizational relations at different levels, such as dyads, triads, groups, and networks, their 
central and unifying concern has been to identify the driving forces through which organizations 
enter into relationships with one another and thusly, with whom organizations choose to partner 
(e.g. Baty, Evan, and Rothermel, 1971; Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz, 
1993; etc.). For instance, some researchers have focused on effective management of 
interdependence and coordination, reducing risks and uncertainty, and knowledge sharing and 
transfer (Gulati, 1998; Kogut, 1994; Leblebici and Salancik, 1982). In recent years, others have 
been revitalizing and expanding their interest in how organizations obtain power and control 
resources through interorganizational coalitions and interests, and how legitimacy is pursued and 
achieved through interorganizational relations (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; Gulati and Stych, 
2007; Oliver, 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Van de Ven and Walker, 1984). Another group 
of scholars has dedicated its efforts to integrating these findings into an overarching framework 
for the motivations of interorganizational relations (Brass, Galskiewicz, Greve, and Tsai, 2004; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985; Oliver, 1990; Van de Ven, 1976).  
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Yet these efforts have largely overlooked another different but powerful motive, organizational 
status, despite the fact that ample empirical evidence has shown that organizations are motivated 
to maintain their status and, if possible, to achieve higher status through entering relations with 
other organizations (Podolny, 2005). Derived from various definitions in literature, the definition 
of “organizational status” in this study is the prestige accorded to an organization for its 
hierarchical position in a social structure, which goes beyond its observable economic 
performance; in other words, it is “a mixture of ascription and achievement” (Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008:61; Gould, 2002; Jensen, 2008; Podolny, 1993; Washington and Zajac, 2005). 
Many studies have detailed the positive outcomes associated with an organization’s status 
position. For example, Podolny and his coauthors found that high status not only “lowers the cost 
of producing and selling a good of a given quality” (Podolny, 1993: 841), but it also has a 
positive effect on a firm’s market share (Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan, 1996), its propensity to 
innovate (Podolny and Stuart, 1995), and its return from partnering with others (Benjamin and 
Podolny, 1999). In addition to the benefits of organizational status, current research has 
demonstrated that one organization’s status is often determined by the status of the other 
organizations with which it affiliates or partners (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Podolny and 
Phillips, 1996). As organizations position themselves through relations with other organizations, 
organizational status is produced and reproduced through partnership, endorsement, or affiliation 
(e.g., Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993). Especially when uncertainty makes it 
difficult to evaluate the quality of a product or its performance, an organization is more likely to 
associate with other organizations for their status (Podolny, 1994; Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000; 
Jensen, 2006). 
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Though existing theory and evidence provide evidence that suggests that status concerns may 
play a key role in motivating interorganizational relation formation and affecting partner choices, 
the question of when and how decisions of interorganizational relations are influenced by 
organizational status remains unanswered. On the one hand, more empirical research is needed to 
understand the important role of organizational status in the formation of interorganizational 
relations. To date, the empirical basis of this issue has been limited to a handful of industry 
contexts and specific types of connections, such as endorsement and affiliations among 
investment banks, wineries, law firms, and biotechnology firms, etc. It is therefore necessary to 
explore different types of interorganizational relations across a range of other research contexts. 
On the other hand, it is not clear how and when organizational status bears on the decision of 
interorganizational relations, given that the influence of organizational status comes into play in 
combination with other factors. As suggested by the integrative frameworks (Galaskiewicz, 
1985; Oliver, 1990), it is challenging to discover the boundary conditions under which 
organizations are motivated to form relationships with some instead of others. Moreover, we do 
not know how and when organizational status is taken into consideration by all those involved in 
this decision-making process.  
 
In an attempt to answer the questions above, this study has two purposes. First, it explores status 
effects in a distinctive form of interorganizational relations that has not been empirically 
examined before: top executive hiring. Personnel movement, especially the movement of top 
executives, has always been intriguing topic in the tradition of interorganizational relations (Baty 
et al., 1971; Kraatz and Moore, 2002; Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973). Top executives are those 
leaders, such as presidents of universities and colleges, in top administrative positions within 
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organizations who not only have overall control and authority within organizations but who also 
represent the organizations symbolically to outside parties (Fligstein, 1990). The selection and 
appointment of top executives is therefore directly related to organizational status because no 
other single individual can be closer to be the bearer of organizational status than the leader at 
the top. To be clear, top executive hiring is here referred to as hiring top executives from other 
organizations (Finkelstein, Hambrick, and Cannella, 2009; Kraatz and Moore, 2002). In top 
executive hiring, the two ends of association are the organization to which the executive moves 
and the organization from which he/she comes (Boeker, 1997; Kraatz and Moore, 2002; Pfeffer 
and Leblebici, 1973). The associations and connections established by top executive hiring are a 
unique form of interorganizational relation, unlike other well-studied status-driven behaviors 
such as affiliate, endorsement, and alliance partnership, which are highly relevant to 
organizational status.  
 
The second purpose of this study is to examine when or under what circumstances organizational 
status is more or less of a concern in decisions about interorganizational relations. Although it is 
an important motive behind many organizational decisions and actions, organizational status is 
not the only or the most important factor that has an impact on interorganizational relation 
decisions. Organizations are sometimes deliberately concerned with their status when they enter 
into interorganizational relations (e.g. Espeland and Sauder, 2007), but on other occasions, 
studies of interorganizational relations do not provide evidence of organizational status in their 
decision-making process (Gulati, 2007). The consequences of these different degrees of status 
concerns are thusly perplexing: status-driven decisions are often criticized for being overly 
pretentious or superficial, while organizations that pay little attention to organizational status 
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may be considered ineffective in their management of organizational status. Therefore, it is 
important to find out what factors are driving organizations to be more or less status-concerned 
in their interorganizational relations decisions.  
 
Responding to the above purposes, this research conducts two semi-independent studies. The 
first study establishes top executive hiring as a distinct form of interorganizational relations for 
the reason that it provides many of the same benefits as other types of interorganizational 
relations (Baty, Evan and Rothermel, 1971; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). It is argued that top 
executive hiring decisions can also affect an organization’s status and therefore status motives 
are likely to play a significant role for these decisions. Moreover, because of the role of top 
executives in organizations, their hiring decisions are highly public and symbolic in nature. The 
general implication is that organizations will tend to hire executives from those organizations of 
equal or higher status and avoid hiring from lower status organizations. It is also expected that 
this pattern is especially prominent in industries that are subjective and when status hierarchies 
are salient and well established. 
 
The second study is to develop and test the theory that explains when status concerns are more or 
less important in determining partner choices. Following the tradition of organization decision-
making theory (Cyert and March, 1963; March, 1994; Simon, 1947), this is a study of status 
consciousness. Status consciousness means the degree to which status considerations are 
important to an organization’s decisions, the extent to which an organization is concerned about 
its own relative status, and in particular the extent to which status concerns tend to “color” an 
organization’s interaction with others (Anderson and Cunningham, 1972; Blalock, 1959:243; 
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Kaufman, 1957). Organizations are increasingly considered to be open systems; in other words, 
interorganizational relation decisions are influenced by multiple parties and interests within and 
among organizations. It is therefore most interesting to explore how or when more weight is 
given to status concerns in the decisions of interorganizational relations due to the inconsistent 
status preferences of the involved parties and interests inside and outside of the organizations. To 
complicate the decision-making process further, ambiguity in the interpretation of status and 
categorical difference also creates room for status consciousness in the decisions of 
interorganizational relations. In correspondence with the above complexities that involve 
multiple interests and ambiguity, this study focuses on status consciousness in political dynamics 
and peer comparisons through the decisions of interorganizational relations.  
 
The context of this research is set on presidential hiring in U.S. higher education, i.e. the hiring 
decisions and processes of chief executive officers from institutions of higher education in the 
United States. These two semi-independent studies examine top executive hiring and its status 
dynamics in U.S. higher education for a period of 20 years, from 1987 to 2006. Higher education 
in the U.S. consists of a variety of colleges and universities that provide post-secondary 
education. It is one of the largest higher education systems in the world, and it has built its 
prestige not only through strong funding and research as an entirety but also by embracing a 
good number of the world’s top colleges and universities. The higher education context is 
appropriate for this proposed study for many reasons. First of all, the majority of presidential 
hires within higher education organizations are external. According to a recent publication on 
American college presidents by the American Council on Education (ACE report, Ross and 
Green, 2000), presidents of all types of colleges and universities are usually hired from another 
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institution rather than from within that same institution. Unlike most firms in the business world, 
universities and colleges often conduct external searches for future presidents instead of relying 
on internal promotions. In addition, organizational status is of particular relevance in this context 
because the quality of higher education is more intangible and, in a sense, is harder to evaluate. 
Moreover, the external environment of colleges and universities is more uncertain. Finally, it is 
also a highly stratified field where executive hiring is consequentially more sensitive to 
organizational status.  
 
This inquiry into top executive hiring and the status dynamics behind such interorganizational 
relations has important implications. Most of all, this research builds upon the findings and 
attempts to make a contribution to contemporary organizational status literature on 
interorganizational relations both theoretically and practically. Theoretically, it examines the 
general patterns of status consciousness in interorganizational relations and, more importantly, 
identifies forces that make organizations change across situations or over time to become more 
or less sensitive to organizational status in interorganizational relations. An underlying 
assumption of this research is that organizational status is only one of the many motives that can 
come to bear on strategic decisions of interorganizational relations. Practically, status 
consciousness does not always seem to be best for organizations, though it may be an important 
force in interorganizational relations. This research studies status consciousness, but it is also 
concerned with those possible (perhaps, pathological) consequences that derive from status 
concerns in interorganizational relations.  
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In order to address the research questions above, this study is organized in the following manner. 
First, it starts with an extensive literature review on the motivations of interorganizational 
relations and, in particular, organizational status, which includes an overview of definitions, 
characteristics, interpretations, and the multiple underlying mechanisms. Building on this review, 
the theory and analysis are staged in two semi-independent studies to address the two research 
purposes. Study 1 first makes a basic argument for the role of status in top executive hiring. Then 
it explains the form of the relationship between organizational status and top executive hiring. 
Taking an organization-centric view, this research examines how organizational status matters 
and how status positions make a difference. After that, this general argument is translated to the 
context specific to the hypotheses, i.e. the context of U.S. higher education. Study 2 develops 
and tests a model that explains when status concerns are more or less influential in 
interorganizational relation formation decisions. Then, drawing on organizational theory of 
decision-making, this research posits that a range of factors intensify or mitigate status concerns 
in interorganizational relation formation decisions. Correspondingly, it focuses on the political 
dynamics of varied interests and parties within and outside organizations and compares 
organizations across categories for their field-level dynamics. Incorporating the research context 
of U.S. higher education, a set of hypotheses in each study have been developed and tested. 
These hypotheses are examined by top executive hiring decisions by U.S. universities and 
colleges using multiple sources of extensive longitudinal archival data. Finally, this research 
concludes with a discussion section that considers research implications and future research 
directions. The theoretical implications of this research are first to confirm that organizational 
status plays an important role in top executive hiring, and more importantly, to identify the 
factors that make organizations more or less status-concerned. In practice, this research 
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demonstrates that organization status may sometimes not be best for organizations in spite of its 
importance in top executive hiring. Future research questions include: what are the consequences 
of status-conscious decisions in interorganizational relationships? Is organizational status 
changed as intended by these actions? How can the seemingly circular relationship between 
organizational status and top executive hiring be disentangled? 
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CHAPTER 2 
MOTIVES FOR INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS 
In recent decades interorganizational relations have drawn much scholarly attention (Aldrich and 
Pfeffer, 1976; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Granovetter, 1985; Mahoney, 2005; Oliver, 1990; Whetten, 
1981; Van de Ven, 1976). Theorists from different traditions have provided a wide range of 
rationales about why organizations enter into relations with one another or how organizations 
make their decisions about with whom they interact. The first half of this chapter reviews the 
motives for the formation of interorganizational relations from different theoretical perspectives. 
It is organized into two main streams of distinct theoretical traditions: organizational economics 
and organizational theory. In addition, the integrating efforts of an overarching framework are 
highlighted to understand the formation of interorganizational relationships. The second half of 
this chapter focuses on organizational status as an emerging yet important perspective. In sum, 
this detailed literature review provides an overview of the definitions, characteristics, 
interpretations, underlying mechanisms, and multiple motives for interorganizational 
relationships and organizational status. 
 
1. Interorganizational Relationships 
Because organizations are viewed as open systems, it is critical to understand organizational 
decisions through the environments in which organizations enter into relationships with others 
(Aldrich and Pfeffer, 1976; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Granovetter, 1985; Oliver, 1990; Whetten, 
1981; Van de Ven, 1976). The environment consists of the set of individuals or organizations 
with whom or which organizations engage in relations in order to secure resources like human 
capital, materials and knowledge and to reduce uncertainty, gain legitimacy, and achieve 
collective goals (Galskiewicz, 1985; Oliver, 1990; Davis and Powell, 1992). Therefore, 
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interorganizational relations are defined very broadly as the relatively enduring transactions, 
flows, and linkages that occur between an organization and one or more organizations in its 
environment (Oliver, 1990). The vast body of interorganizational relations research studies the 
dynamics of coordination and competition in different forms of interorganizational relations such 
as joint ventures, strategic alliances, trade associations, director interlocking and personnel 
flows, at the levels of dyads, triads, groups, and networks (e.g. Baty, Evan, and Rothermel, 1971; 
Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Mizruchi and Galaskiewicz, 1993).  
 
1.1 Organizational Economics 
According to organizational economics, organizations enter interorganizational relations when 
they are more efficient governance forms between “to make” by themselves and “to buy” from 
the market (Mahoney, 2005). In this tradition, the dominant views include transaction cost 
economics, the resource-based view, knowledge-based view, and agency theory. These 
perspectives assume efficiency under bounded rationality is pursued through minimizing 
transaction costs, gaining economies of scale, and maximizing values under uncertainty. Scholars 
in this tradition argue that organizations enter into interorganizational relations to improve 
efficiency and to gain access to valuable assets although neither hierarchy nor market provides a 
better, more cost-efficient alternative. 
 
From a transaction cost economics perspective, interorganizational relations are a range of 
hybrid governance structures between these two extremes: hierarchy and market. They are 
employed when an exchange calls for an intermediate form of governance between hierarchy and 
market due to asset specificity, risk/uncertainty, and transaction frequency (Williamson, 1991). 
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Assuming bounded rationality, market is considered more efficient for unspecific, certain, and 
infrequent transactions, while hierarchies are considered more efficient for specific, uncertain, 
and frequent transactions (Williamson, 1985). Thus, the characteristics of a transaction determine 
the relative costs of market-based governance versus hierarchy-based governance (to buy vs. to 
make). Overall, empirical support for transactional economics arguments is somewhat mixed, 
with some studies finding strong empirical support (Masten and Saussier, 2000) and others 
indicating less robust results (Carter and Hodgson, 2006; David and Han, 2004).  
 
From the resource-based views perspective, organizations form interorganizational relations to 
obtain access to complementary resources. Scholars from a resource-based views perspective 
understand an organization as a collection of resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 
1959). Due to resource heterogeneity and immobility, resource-based views scholars argue that 
organizations develop firm-specific valuable resources, capabilities, and competences to build a 
competitive advantage. Thus, interorganizational relations are one of the major vehicles to 
acquire resources together with internal development, external procurement, and full acquisition 
(Rivera-Santos and Inkpen, 2009). Interorganizational relations typically provide quicker access 
to resources than internal development does, allow access to tacit and imperfectly tradable 
resources, and are less costly than acquiring an entire organization. 
 
Agency theorists propose that organizations enter into interorganizational relations to align 
incentives between principals and agents when ownership and control are separated. As such, 
they study what mechanisms align the goals and actions of agents (i.e. managers) with the 
demands of principals (i.e. shareholders) (Fama and Jensen, 1983). This principal-agent 
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relationship model predicts that if risk-averse managers are given rewards that are independent 
of their efforts, they will have no incentive to exert efforts that are detrimental to the interests of 
shareholders. From this perspective, interorganizational relations are a specific form of 
relationships between principals and agents, in which ownership and control are separated. 
Interorganizational relations are of particular interest for two reasons. First, interorganizational 
relations are like any other strategic expansion decision made by managers (agents) according to 
their interests, but they bring potential risks for shareholders (principals) (Ahern and Weston, 
2007). Second, interorganizational relations are a form of structure in which partner 
organizations also need to create mechanisms to align their interests.  
 
In sum, the organizational economics perspective states that interorganizational relations are 
formed when it is more efficient for an organization to enter relationship with other organizations 
than either to remain on its own or make transactions through the market. The focus of this 
perspective is to identify an appropriate governance structure, to obtain complementary 
resources, and to align incentives among partner organizations. 
 
1.2 Organization Theory 
In contrast, organization theorists believe that organizations partner with others to accomplish 
tasks more effectively. Interorganizational relationships enable organizations to gain resources 
and allies, improve their reputation, status, and legitimacy, and to gain access to greater and 
more diverse sources of social capital. These studies also advocate for more enduring rather than 
more transient interorganizational relationships, which are most beneficial when they facilitate 
trust, collaboration, and learning between organizations. Four main theoretical perspectives are 
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reviewed below in relation to interorganizational relations: resource dependence theory, 
stakeholder theory, institutional theory, and social networks theory. 
 
Resource dependence theory emphasizes power and dependence as motives for 
interorganizational relations, as organizations use these coalitions of interests to gain control 
over critical resources (Hillman, Withers, and Collins, 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The 
key assumption in this approach is that organizations are dependent upon critical resources that 
may be controlled or owned by others, leading to power struggles and uncertainty in their 
operating environment. By forming interorganizational relations with other organizations to exert 
control over those resources, this uncertainty can be reduced. Meanwhile, interorganizational 
relations can facilitate coordination and increase power and influence. 
 
Similarly, stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984; Laplume, Sonpar, and Litz, 2008) suggests that 
organizations will partner with influential stakeholders to reduce uncertainty. Stakeholder 
theorists focus on identifying and understanding the interests and claims of different 
stakeholders, including employees, customers, suppliers, activists, legislators, and the media. 
Forming interorganizational relations with stakeholders is one way that organizations can better 
understand stakeholders’ views and can influence them in positive ways. In particular, 
organizations may partner with stakeholder organizations that are powerful, legitimate, and 
salient to advance their status positions, to gain their legitimacy, and to improve their 
reputations.  
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Legitimacy is often examined by institutional theorists, who suggest that it is one of the key 
drivers of interorganizational relations. This perspective’s basic assumption is that organizational 
actions are socially constructed and constrained by isomorphic forces that prompt organizations 
to conform (Dimaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2000). These isomorphic pressures lead 
organizations to adopt practices that mimic their peers or follow norms and regulations. In doing 
so, organizations may gain legitimacy and reputation in addition to improving their performance. 
 
As with institutional theory, social network perspective also emphasizes an organization’s social 
standing in the social structure (Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Kilduff and Tsai, 2003). According to 
this perspective, organizations are tied to other organizations by both market transactions and 
social connections. The motivation for interorganizational relations is to gain information and 
knowledge by creating a new tie or strengthening a current tie. Relatively long-term relationships 
will result in greater trust and collaboration, with a more extensive exchange of social capital and 
the ability to transfer more complex knowledge. Interorganizational relations are important for 
organizational learning and innovation, as these activities often are promoted and facilitated by 
trust in and cooperation with interorganizational relations. For instance, Powell, Koput, and 
Smith-Doerr (1996) found that dedicated biotechnology firms that had more networking 
experience subsequently gained more knowledge, had more diverse network portfolios, and 
became more central in collaborative networks. Ahuja (2000) found that chemical firms that had 
more inter-firm ties subsequently were more likely to form joint ventures based on new 
technologies. 
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To summarize, the organization theory perspectives argue that the formation of 
interorganizational relations is often based on prior relationships, trust, and social connections 
between organizations. Since organizations are embedded in a broader social structure, 
organizations may be motivated by legitimacy and reputation to make connections. 
Organizations may also form relationships with powerful partners to reduce their dependency 
and uncertainty in environment. 
 
1.3 Integrating Frameworks 
In the large body of interorganizational relations literature, the rationales provided by each of 
these theoretical perspectives may or may not vary greatly in explaining why organizations form 
relationships with others. To summarize, the possible motives for interorganizational relations 
are effective management of interdependence and coordination, reducing risks and uncertainty, 
and knowledge sharing and transfer (Gulati, 1998; Gulati, Nohria, and Zaheer, 2000; Kogut, 
1994; Leblebici and Salancik, 1982). They may also be motivated to obtain power and control 
resources through interorganizational coalitions and interests (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005; 
Gulati and Stych, 2007; Oliver, 1990; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Van de Ven and Walker, 
1984) or to pursue legitimacy or status or reputation (Cowen, 2012; Gulati and Higgins, 2003; 
Jensen, 2003; Podolny, 2001; Powell, 1990).  There have been ongoing efforts to bring together 
the motives and forms of interorganizational relations in the contingency approach (Oliver, 1990; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985; Brass, et al., 2004). 
 
Galskiewicz (1985) noted four motives behind interorganizational relations: to acquire resources, 
to reduce uncertainty, to enhance legitimacy, and to attain collective goals. He examined three 
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arenas of interorganizational relations: resource procurement and allocation, political advocacy, 
and organizational legitimation. For each arena, he pointed out that the motives for 
interorganizational relations are different. For example, in resource procurement and allocation, 
the focus is dependency and uncertainty in environment. In political advocacy, specific attention 
is given to coalitions of interests and collective actions. In the arena of organizational 
legitimation, efforts are given to identifying with highly legitimate organizations or societal 
symbols.  
 
Oliver (1990) proposed a set of determinants of interorganizational relationship formation and 
applied them to the predictions of different types of interorganizational relations. These critical 
contingencies include necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability and legitimacy, and 
they motivate organizations to enter into relationships with one another. In this seminal work, 
organizations are assumed to have choices, are conscious, and make intentional decisions for 
their purposes. According to this framework, organizations may enter into relationships with 
other organizations to fulfill necessary legal or regulatory requirements, to exercise power and 
control other organizations or their resources, to reciprocally benefit from coordination and 
sharing of knowledge and information, to achieve the most efficient input/output ratio, to attain 
stability in uncertain environment, and to enhance legitimacy or improve status and reputation. 
These conditions are brought together from a contingency perspective to predict under what 
circumstances certain forms of interorganizational relations are preferred over others.  
 
In a more recent work, Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, and Tsai (2004) not only look at the 
conditions that promote the formation of interorganizational relations but also identify conditions 
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that facilitate interorganizational cooperation, such as experience, trust, norms, equity, and 
context. For example, organizations that have more experience working with other organizations 
are more likely to form new and more diverse relations and to become dominant players (Powell, 
Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996). In another example, organizations of similar status were found 
to be more likely to form interorganizational relations (Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000); 
meanwhile, Emerson (1962) argued that the power differential between organizations could 
create an unstable situation for low-status organizations. 
 
However, neither the interorganizational relations literature nor the integrating framework for 
interorganizational relations pays much attention to organizational status. These sources pay little 
attention to the role of organizational status; however, organizational status is a different yet very 
powerful motive has been largely overlooked from an organization-centric point of view 
(Podolny, 2005; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Therefore, the second half of this chapter focuses 
on the concept of organizational status, its definitions, characteristics, manifestations, and 
mechanisms.  
 
2. Organizational Status 
2.1 What is organizational status? 
Sociology scholars have long endeavored to further or refine our understanding of status through 
various definitions. As mentioned above, Blau (1977: 57) broadly defined status as “attributes of 
people that exhibit graduations,” including but not limited to those associated with prestige or 
power. In his definition, Blau did not require status to be manifest in superordination or 
subordination in social relations. Blau further explained his preference for treating status as a 
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continuous graduation, and he argued that the existence of ordinal scales is only due to a lack of 
accuracy in the measurement of the underlying status concept. Meanwhile, status is also broadly 
referred to as a position in a social system that is stable and significant enough to generate beliefs 
and expectations, ensuring a pattern of behaviors (Broom & Selznick, 1955). This definition 
followed the sociological tradition by considering status as social position and describing some 
of the characteristics of status. However, such broad definitions have not provided me with 
sufficient means to differentiate status from a position or role in general, such as professor and 
student, or manager and employee, or a social differentiation parameter, such as sex, race, and 
religion. Therefore, I searched for more definitions of status in literature. For example, Weber 
(1978:187) defined status as “a social estimation of honor.” He noted that status is a positional or 
relational element of a social structure that can exist independently of economic antecedents and 
the consequences of which can at best be described as privileges. Status is then associated with 
“Matthew Effect,” the phenomenon in which contributions of apparently similar quality are 
evaluated differentially depending on the status of the contributors (Merton 1968; Zuckerman 
and Merton 1971; Cole and Cole 1973). Status is also interpreted as a deference or social 
exchange in social interactions by which status accumulates as expendable capital (Blau, 1964).  
 
Following in the footsteps of sociologists, organization and management scholars have also 
contributed to our understanding about what status is. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) pointed out 
that organizational status is relatively stable as it aggregates collective perceptions of an 
organization’s past performance and future prospects in an organizational field of reputational 
orderings. Podolny (1993) defined it as “the perceived quality of that producer’s products in 
relation to the perceived quality of that producer’s competitor’s products” (1993:830). Recently, 
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Jensen & Roy (2008) depicted organizational status as a “bracket” established on discontinuous 
hierarchical structures. A side note here is that this definition differs from broader views of 
status, such as Blau’s. I will continue this discussion in the methods section about status 
measure. As in a recent study of status origin, status is defined in this study as the accorded 
prestige for the hierarchical positions in a social structure (Gould, 2002). Building on all the 
above efforts, organizational status is defined here as the accorded prestige to an organization for 
its hierarchical position in a social structure more than merely for its observable economic 
performance, i.e., “a mixture of ascription and achievement” (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008:61; 
Gould, 2002; Jensen, 2008; Podolny, 1993; Washington and Zajac, 2005). 
 
From the above definition, it is evident that organizational status is a hierarchical position in the 
same way as status defined in a broad sense. In order to better understand organizational status, 
there are two necessary elements: what prestige means to organizations and how it is gained by 
organizations. First, unlike power, which emphasizes how one can carry out one’s own will 
despite resistance (Weber, 1947), prestige, according to this definition of organizational status, 
denotes a standing or an estimation of respect and admiration in the eyes of others. In other 
words, prestige involves appearing “good” or “better” not only to peers but also to their related 
third parties (Wegener, 1992; Davis and Moore, 1945; Parsons, 1940). For instance, take 
Harvard University as an example. Its status as a top university in the United States, and even 
worldwide, is established not because it is self-claimed but because it is perceived in consensus 
to be prestigious by its peers and related others, people, or organizations. In contrast, it would 
seem to be a joke to most if a diploma mill promoted itself as a top university. Organizational 
status is a mixture of ascription and achievement because it is both ascribed and achieved, or put 
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in another way, both unearned and earned (Washington and Zajac, 2005; Deephouse and 
Suchman, 2008; Wegener, 1992). This disconnect between organizational status and economic-
based performance is intriguing. To use the analogy of capital, organizational status can be 
ascribed and achieved, or it can be accrued from both unearned and earned income. Unearned or 
ascribed, as historical legacy it is inherited, achieved, or earned based on performance-based 
evaluations. To continue to use Harvard University as example, I will quickly notice that its 
status is somewhat loosely coupled with what it does or how well it does (or does not). At the 
same time, it would be somewhat disappointing for a less well-established university that forges 
ahead with effective reforms to find its status unimproved. 
 
From this brief summary of what organizational status is and where it comes from, it is clear that 
improved organizational status operates by staying far from what it is not. The following 
discussions clarify the distinctions between organizational status and the other concepts with 
which it is often confused or compared.  
 
2.2 What is not organizational status? 
The above section covers different ways of defining status and organizational status. However, 
the more discussions there are about organizational status, the more some other concepts emerge 
in comparison, such as reputation. Wisdom may advise that there is no better way of 
understanding what something is than disentangling it from what it is not. The next section 
disentangles organizational status from some of its related concepts. Such efforts are even more 
meaningful if our understanding of organizational status benefits from the existing research on 
these related concepts.  
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First of all, status and reputation are two closely related yet distinct concepts (Washington and 
Zajac, 2005). Fombrun and Shanley (1990) define reputation as the result of perceptions. 
Fombrun (1996) further defines organizational reputation as a perceptual representation of an 
organization’s past actions and future prospects that describe its overall appeal to all its key 
constituents when compared to other leading rivals. Roberts and Dowling (2002) expand on 
these definitions to indicate that reputation manifests itself as the extent to which a firm is seen 
as “good” and not “bad.” Podolny (1993, 1996, 2001) mentions that reputation is determined by 
the value of the organization’s previous efforts. Weigelt and Camerer (1988) believe that 
organizational reputation is the jointly held beliefs of underlying characteristics of an 
organization. Meanwhile, Rao (1994) indicates that organizational reputation is socially 
constructed and legitimates organizations in a field. In short, organizational reputation is referred 
to as an overall perceptual representation of an organization’s past actions and future prospects to 
its key constituents (Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun and Van Riel, 2004; Love and Kraatz, 2009; 
Robert and Dowling, 2002; Schultz, Mouritsen, and Gabrielsen, 2001). For example, 
subjectively assessed organizational reputations are produced through the popular media such as 
Fortune magazine’s “Most Admired Company” rankings and the reputational scores in U.S. 
News and World Report’s “Best Colleges,” both have been widely accepted and actively 
followed by practitioners and researchers. 
 
Organizational status and reputation are both a “stock” and a “flow.” In organizational reputation 
research, many prior studies have attended to the relationship between “stock-like” reputation 
and other consequences, such as maintaining financial soundness and assuming 
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social/community responsibilities (CSR), signaling product quality and charging price premiums, 
inhibiting competitors and attracting investors, recruiting talents and gaining status (e.g. Davies, 
Chun, Da Silva, and Roper, 2003; Dowling, 2001; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996; 
Fombrun and Van Riel, 2004; Fryxell and Wang, 1994; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, and 
Sever, 2005; Roberts and Dowling, 2002). Less work has been done in terms of treating 
organizational reputation as a “flow” and examining which strategic actions such as downsizing, 
M&A, etc., and reputation management techniques, have led people to change their opinions of 
an organization’s overall appeal, or, in other words, to understand how organizational reputation 
is changed (e.g. Flanagan and O’Shaughnessy, 2005; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Love and 
Kraatz, 2009; Staw and Epstein, 2000; Williams and Barrett, 2000).  
 
Despite the similar nature of reputation and status as a response to and a representation of 
signals, the uniqueness of organizational status is emphasized in this research. For instance, 
Podolny and Phillips (1996) noted that organizational status incorporates the social link and 
exchange between actors whereas reputation does not. Reputation, unlike status, has no clear 
rank ordering. It is informal in the sense that it relies on evaluative activities that are not closely 
tied to the actor's economic, social, or professional position. For example, many film and sports 
stars build reputations for social activism that are distantly related to their work in their chosen 
field of endeavor. The relevant point for the present discussion is that this reputation may under 
certain circumstances enhance their overall status. 
 
A good example of how status and reputation differ and how the two can nonetheless work 
together is philanthropy. The wealthy often use philanthropy to enhance their reputation as 
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generous or discerning people. It is for this reason that while philanthropists seek status through 
the size of their donations relative to the giving of other rich philanthropists (Murray, 2006), they 
are aware that the reputation of their endowments may depend on the quality of their giving. 
 
The close relationship between status and reputation is based on the ability to recycle one into 
the other. Status is a base for creating reputation, and reputation is used to enhance status. Thus, 
large firms use reputation to charge higher prices, the profits from which are then used to invest 
in activities (e.g. better service and advertising) that create greater reputation. Likewise, 
individuals acquire greater status by forming alliances with socially powerful actors but then take 
care to show that they are loyal and trustworthy, thereby generating a reputation for being 
reliable allies that are likely to remain in good status when it comes to acquiring more allies. 
 
The above discussions about organizational reputation and status illustrates that both are aimed 
at perceived overall quality of an organization. In addition, researchers have drawn on the similar 
mechanisms, especially signals, to understand the formation and impact of organizational 
reputation or status (e.g. D’Aveni, 2000; Dollinger, Golden, and Saxton, 1997; Podolny and 
Phillips, 1996; Rao, 1994; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Staw and Epstein, 2000; Jensen and Roy, 
2008). With that being said, it is still possible to borrow from past research on organizational 
reputation, especially on signaling effect, for a better understanding of organizational status. 
 
Status and legitimacy are also often put together for comparison (Elsbach, 1994; Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990; Deephouse and Carter, 2005; Deephouse and Suchman, 2008). Legitimacy is an 
important concept that is often used in institutional research to explain why some practices and 
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organizational forms are more prevalent than others. Organizational legitimacy is “an anchor-
point of a vastly expanded theoretical apparatus addressing the normative and cognitive forces 
that constrain, construct and empower organizational actors” (Suchman, 1995: 572). In other 
words, “Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995:572). Accordingly, institutional theories highlight that 
organizations may strategically adopt certain practices or organizational forms in order to 
increase their legitimacy in the field, thereby improving their chances for survival and their 
performances (Oliver, 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Scott, 2002). 
 
Both organizational status and legitimacy function similarly as basis for acceptability and access. 
Like the analogy of prism, organizational status is a differentiation device that separates 
organizations into different groups where they mainly associate within the group (Blau, 1964; 
Podolny, 2001). Moreover, a surprisingly similar approach is both used in organizational status 
and legitimacy research. For example, Ashfroth and Gibbs (1990) proposed two general 
approaches, i.e., substantive and symbolic, for organizational legitimacy. They also highlighted 
three purposes for legitimation efforts: gaining, maintaining, and defending. Nonetheless, status 
by definition is a tiered structure that further refines the explanations of legitimacy (Strang and 
Sine, 2001).  
 
Finally, if status, reputation, and legitimacy are compared altogether, it is clear that there is much 
similarity in these research streams but also significant differences among them. They may look 
at similar antecedents, consequences, mechanisms, sources, etc. For this reason, organizational 
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status may borrow a lot from the research on organizational reputation and legitimacy. However, 
organizational status is fundamentally different from the others. The picture is even clearer by 
their measures: legitimacy is dichotomous; status is mostly ordinal and categorical; and 
reputation is continuous (Deephouse and Suchman, 2008; Deephouse and Carter, 2005).  
 
Because status-seeking is part of a generalized competition for prestige and recognition, it is 
closely related to reputation-seeking (Washington and Zajac, 2005; Perretti and Negro, 2006). To 
understand the relationships, it is important to distinguish between status as a formal property of 
social, economic, and professional systems and reputation as an informal process that is based on 
interpretation and attribution. Status-seeking as a formal process usually takes place in 
relationship to a social, economic, or professional system whereas ranking of individuals is based 
on criteria that are intrinsic to these systems. For example, election to town council elevates 
some citizens to a higher status, appearing on the Forbes richest list divides the super-rich from 
those who are just rich, and winning awards for professional achievement is a distinction that 
divides exceptional talent from solid performers. Put differently, status-seeking in these instances 
is based not only on trying to improve one's own position in absolute terms, but also on the 
relative position of others. 
 
2.3 Key Characteristics of Organizational Status 
From the above discussions about organizational status, it is clear that status as a position affects 
an organization’s relations with others, and, in turn, that the organization positions itself through 
relations with others. However, what organizational status actually is so far has not been made 
clear. Drawing on both the literature of status and organizational status, some key characteristics 
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associated with organizational status are summarized, i.e. scaled, relative, self-perpetual, 
reputational, and signaling. In practice, these characteristics most likely appear in combinations 
of more than one at a time to different schools of scholars in social and management research. 
 
TABLE 2.1 KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF ORGNAIZATIONAL STATUS 
  
Explanations 
Relational It affects an organization’s relations with others, and the 
organization also positions itself through connections with others. 
Scaled It is an order of either one above the other or the same. 
Relative The hierarchical order may vary across situations. 
Self-perpetual It is relatively stable over time. 
Reputational It is possibly changed with the performance of the organization. 
Signaling It is formed and functioning in signals. 
 
First, status is scaled in hierarchy. Blau (1977) implied that status indicates a vertical graduation 
process incidental to inequality as heterogeneity describes horizontal differentiation. Parson 
(1953:117) provided accounts that show that status is hierarchical because it is driven by 
personal differentiating values. He noted that, “To say that all acts are valued equally, that it did 
not ‘matter’ what a person did or how he did it, would simply be to say that the category of 
evaluation was irrelevant to the analysis of action. But given the process of evaluation, the 
probability is that it will serve to differentiate entities in a rank order of some kind.” It is the 
hierarchical nature of status that causes the monopolization of opportunities by groups of higher 
status at the expense of others (Weber, 1978). More importantly, as Simmel (1950) pointed out, 
each hierarchical status position has an established set of expectations, behaviors, and rewards to 
a greater or lesser degree that all individual actors abide by.  
 
Second, status is relative. Dumont (1980:244) pointed out that status is of relativity, i.e. left is the 
left only in relation with the right. He wrote, “As moderns, I tend to put everything on the same 
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plane. If it were possible, I would have nothing to do with hierarchy. When I introduce it, I must 
not forget that it is intrinsically two-dimensional. As soon as I posit a relation of superior to 
inferior, I must become accustomed to specifying at what level this hierarchical relation itself is 
situated. It cannot be true from one end of experience to the other (only artificial hierarchies 
make this claim), for this would be to deny the hierarchical dimension itself, which requires 
situations to be distinguished by value. Hierarchy thus offers possibility of reversal: that which at 
a superior level was superior may become inferior at an inferior level. The left can become the 
right in what might be called a ‘left situation’, and again, in the complex complementariness that 
unites them, each of two moieties may appear alternately superior and inferior.” 
 
The next two characteristics of organizational status, self-perpetual and reputational, are closely 
related. On the one hand, status is self-perpetual because it is relatively stable over time. This 
stability in status is mostly due to a separation between performance and status. Podolny and 
Phillips (1996) demonstrated that past performance outcomes do not fully explain the current 
organizational status. Meanwhile, the unearned non-merit-based part of status, which is 
irrelevant to the earned performance-based reputation, comes mostly from historical legacy 
(Washington and Zajac, 2005). On the other hand, status is also reputational because it is not 
entirely determined by historical legacy but also achieved through efforts, such as merit-based 
performances that are directly related to reputation, partnership with high status partners, or 
endorsements from high status organizations, etc. (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybel, 1999; Washington 
and Zajac, 2005; Podolny, 2002). It is both elements—the earned and unearned, the achieved and 
ascribed, the perpetuity and changeability of status—that make it unique and interesting to study 
in the setting of organizations.  
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Finally, organizational status is signaling. In economics, a signal is an “alterable” and 
“observable” indicator of quality, the indicator must at least partially manipulable by the actor, 
and it must be obtained with cost or difficulty inversely correlated with the general quality of the 
producer (Spence, 1974). For instance, a professional certificate is a signal of qualification 
because an individual’s efforts are essential in the certification process and because it is more 
difficult to attain for those who lack of necessary skills or knowledge. Similarly, despite the fact 
that the status of an organization depends largely on the expressed opinions and actions of others, 
the organization exercises at least some control over its status since its own past actions and 
future prospects are important in understanding how it is perceived. Moreover, the difficulty of 
acquiring status for an organization is inversely associated with the general quality level of its 
outcomes. In this sense, the conceptualization of status as “a signal of underlying quality of a 
firm’s products” is compatible with the formal economic understanding of signals (Podolny, 
1993: 831). Organizations that are of high status over time develop their reputations for quality, 
which will then serves useful signaling function when other forms of direct and credible 
information on quality are lacking or unclear (Spence, 1974; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988; 
Podolny, 1993). Related to organizational status’s characteristic of being reputational, it has been 
well established that external audiences form or change their reputational perception of an 
organization in response to various “signals” that the organization sends out (Podolny 1993, 
2005; Podolny and Phillips 1996; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Deephouse, 2000; Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990; Fombrun and Van Riel, 2004; Rindova, et al., 2005). Among the multitude of 
signals that are generated, transmitted and received, status, firmly rooted in the social structure of 
differential stratification, signals power imbalances related to one’s own advantage over others 
! 30!
(Blau, 1964; Weber, 1978). At the same time, as signals about organizations’ past performances 
and future prospects diffuse, individual perceptions perpetuate as collective judgment of status 
and reputational orderings in the organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  
 
Taking all the key characteristics together, status is a relative, self-perpetual, and signaling. It is 
alive in relations, but only in part achievable through performance-based reputation, with the rest 
of it ascribable to historical legacy. These key characteristics of organizational status are all 
important in my later discussions about how organizational status influences executive hiring. 
 
2.4 Status Manifestations 
At the individual level, Blau described status as expendable capital, “which an individual can 
draw on to obtain benefits, which is expended in use, and which can be expanded by profitably 
investing it at interest” (1964:132). In such a game of status, he further argued that an individual 
gains in status if he associates with persons of superior status on an egalitarian basis (i.e., 
“expanded by profitably investing it at interest”), and by the same token, loses in status if he 
regularly socializes with others of inferior status (i.e., “expended in use”). Likewise, 
organizations consider how they can make use of and establish their associations with others: the 
status position of an organization affects its relations with others, and in turn, the organization 
positions itself in status hierarchy through establishing linkages with others (Blau, 1964; 
Homans, 1961; Coleman, 1990). For instance, past research has demonstrated that one 
organization’s status is determined by the status of other organizations with which it affiliates or 
partners (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Podolny and Phillips, 1996). Especially when 
uncertainty makes it difficult to evaluate the quality of its product or its performance, an 
! 31!
organization is more likely to associate with other organizations for its status (Podolny, 1994; 
Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000; Jensen, 2006). By the same analogy of capital, organizational 
status flows or exchanges in thusly formed associations and connections. Through these 
relational “pipes,” status is expendable capital insofar as one’s loss is the other’s gain. Moreover, 
these social relations act like “prisms”: status is a differentiation device that splits up the entirety 
into strata while emitting signals to related parties (Blau, 1964; Podolny, 2001). Therefore, status 
is indicative of behaviors because it functions through associations and relations (“pipes”) and 
symbols and signals (“prisms”).  
 
2.4.1 Associations and relations 
Status flows through associations and relations that involve exchange or deference. On the one 
hand, exchange relations are characterized by “an implicit, loose equality” (Podolny, 2005:14). 
Blau (1964) noted that an individual’s status depends largely on the status of those who accept 
him and socialize with him as an equal. If an individual associates with a person of higher status 
on an egalitarian basis, the reward is a possible increase in his/her own status. By the same token, 
an individual who regularly socializes with others of lower status is in danger of being 
considered by the community to be on a lower status level.  
 
On the other hand, deference relations provide another channel for status flow. For example, in 
observing the interactions among federal enforcement agents, Blau (1962) found that receiving 
deference from high-status actors usually generates more status gain than receiving deference 
from low-status actors. Similarly, Elias and Scotson (1965) discovered the endorsement of a 
higher-status resident helps open doors for newcomers in communities.  
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2.4.2 Symbols and signals 
Organizational decisions and actions are likely to catch the attention of their external audiences 
through signals. In the interpretation of a signal in interorganizational relations, the status of one 
organization is indicative of what it indicates to its associates (Spence, 1974; Podolny, 1993).  
 
In organizational literature, it is well established that external audiences form or change their 
reputational perception of an organization in response to various “signals” that the organization 
sends out (Podolny 1993; Podolny and Phillips 1996; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999; Deephouse, 
2000; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Fombrun and Van Riel, 2004; Rindova, et al., 2005).  
 
2.5 Status Mechanisms 
As seen above, organizational status is a critical force in organizational decisions and actions. 
However, it is not clear how it plays its role, especially in terms of different status positions. A 
general observation on organizational status as a social position is that there are always two 
possible directions for its effect: status conforming or status non-conforming behaviors. In the 
first scenario, the motivation is to maintain existing organizational status. For the second type of 
effect leading to non-conforming behaviors, the motivations are more complicated depending on 
what status position an organization takes. Possible motivations are either the ambition for 
achieving higher status or the anxiety of losing current status. The below table summarizes what 
status motive(s) an organization may have at each status position. 
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TABLE 2.2 A SUMMARY OF STATUS MECHANISMS 
 The ambition for 
achieving higher status 
The maintaining of 
existing status 
The anxiety of losing 
existing status 
High  ! ! 
Middle ! ! ! 
Low ! !  
 
2.5.1 The maintaining of existing status 
As discussed above, status flows through associations and relations that involve exchange or 
deference. Exchange relations are characterized by “an implicit, loose equality” (Podolny, 
2005:14). Blau (1964) noted that an individual’s status depends largely on the status of those 
who accept him and socialize with him as an equal. Meanwhile, to be associated with other 
organizations of the same or different status unquestionably signals to an organization’s key 
constituents, thereby influencing their subjective evaluations of the organization’s overall status. 
D’Aveni (1996) found a homogeneous and closed system using a multiconstituency approach to 
organizational status. The underlying assumption is that organizations defend their status by 
aiming to remain in the same status groups. Han (1994) examined the phenomenon of high-level 
isomorphism in the auditor selection and found that status positions condition what organizations 
choose as their auditors. However, imitation comes from peer pressure to remain in the same 
status group. Metiu (2006) specified the mechanisms through which status positions are 
maintained or reinforced through group dynamics. 
 
2.5.2 The ambition for achieving higher status 
If an individual associates with a person of higher status on an egalitarian basis, the reward is a 
possible raise of his/her own. Low-status organizations seek to achieve higher status, however, 
giving deference to superiors impedes relaxed socializing. Podolny, Stuart, and other scholars 
have successfully shown that organizations tend to aim for higher status by getting endorsement 
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from higher-status organizations, partnering with higher-status organizations, associating with 
higher-status organizations, etc. Lounsbury (2002) demonstrated that organizations are more 
likely to gain higher status in institutional transformation. 
 
2.5.3 The anxiety of losing existing status 
An individual who regularly socializes with others of lower status is in danger of being 
considered by the community to be lower status. High-status organizations, rewarded with 
deference from the inferior, are in danger of losing prestige by associating with those of lower 
status. Phillips and Zuckerman (1999) found that organizations are more likely to conform when 
they are on the dividing lines of “in” and “out.” Jensen (2006) found that organizations get 
questions from their partners if they are disassociated from high-status partners. 
 
To recap, organizational status serves as a powerful motive, as much as the other motives, to 
drive organizations to enter relationships with other organizations. Nonetheless, it has been often 
neglected in the study of interorganizational relations so that the question of how and when such 
decisions of interorganizational relations are influenced by organizational status remains 
unanswered. The following chapters are aimed to address these unanswered questions. To begin 
with, the subsequent chapter examines status effects in a distinctive form of interorganizational 
relations that has not been empirically examined before: top executive movement. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDY 1: TOP EXECUTIVE HIRING AS DRIVEN  
BY ORGANIZATIONAL STATUS 
As stated above, this research joins scholarly efforts to understand the decision of 
interorganizational relations, i.e. why organizations enter into relationships with others and with 
whom they partner. This chapter, together with the next chapter, specifically addresses the first 
purpose of this research, that is, to explore status effects in a distinctive form of 
interorganizational relations: top executive hiring. Inspired by prior research on 
interorganizational relations, this chapter begins with a brief introduction of top executive hiring 
as an interorganizational relation decision. Then it focuses on organizational status as a motive in 
top executive hiring; in other words, the role of organizational status. The next chapter will 
introduce the empirical context of US higher education, develop hypotheses and present an initial 
analysis.  
 
Top Executive Hiring as an Interorganizational Relation Decision  
Top executive hiring is an important strategic decision that organizations make among the 
choices they have or are given. Amongst the multitude of decisions and actions by any 
organization, choosing its top executive, i.e. the future top leader, either from within or from 
outside – and if from outside, from where – is of great strategic importance because top 
executives are those leaders at the top administrative position in organizations who not only have 
overall control and authority within organizations, but who also represent organizations 
symbolically to any other outside parties (Fligstein, 1990). Nevertheless, top executive hiring is a 
unique type of interorganizational relation because it involves organizations at one end and 
individuals at the other end. The labor market of individuals is a separate system that individuals 
act on their own considerations of pay, location, status, and the other factors and as a result, a top 
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executive hiring is a two-way selection both by the organization and by the individual. However, 
top executive hiring is a distinctive organizational decision of interorganizational relations for 
the following important reasons.  
 
First, top executive hiring may have similar effect on organizations like any other 
interorganizational relations (Boeker, 1997; Kraatz and Moore, 2002; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973). For example, scholars have argued that the movement of executives 
between organizations has been an important process for communication and socialization so 
that interorganizational structures may be promoted this way (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer 
and Leblebici, 1973). Kraatz and Moore (2002) also demonstrated that when executives move 
from one organization to the other, their different skills, understandings, assumptions, and values 
may lead to institutional change at the field level.  
 
Second, top executive hiring also creates an interface between an organization and its 
environment through the acquisition of human capital. The environment in interorganizational 
relations consists of other organizations from which key resources, including human capital, are 
acquired. Barnard (1938:73) defined an organization as “a system of consciously coordinated 
activities or efforts of two or more persons.” To pursue their goals, organizations acquire human, 
financial, material, and other resources from their environment. Research on interorganizational 
relations studies the interface between an organization and its environment, which is made of 
other organizations where resources are obtained and influences are exerted (Baty, Evan and 
Rothermel, 1971).  
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Second, personnel flow and especially, top executive movement, which has been a traditionally 
well-accepted phenomenon in the research of interorganizational relations. The recruitment of 
personnel is a universal and recurrent organizational decision and process (Collins and Clark, 
2003). The flow of personnel, especially top executives among organizations, falls in the 
tradition of interorganizational relations research as an important strategic decision for two 
reasons (Baty, Evan and Rothermel, 1971; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). First, these members 
create a flow of information and knowledge between organizations. Second, they are conscious 
or unconscious carriers of values, cultures, and institutions.  
 
Lastly, recent findings about the consequences of hiring top executives from outside 
organizations have been intriguing. As noted, top executive hiring creates a connection between 
organizations that is similar to any other interorganizational relationships in terms of transfer of 
knowledge, resources, and values. When organizations promote top executives from within, they 
are often prepared by selecting and training relay executives over well intended but often failed 
succession planning. Prior research has shown when organizations hire from others, they often 
choose those who are essentially indistinguishable and interchangeable from their own 
candidates, especially if there is no organizational failure or crisis involved (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 2000). This suggests that normative isomorphism, through continuous 
selection and socialization processes (e.g., professionalism in the form of professional and trade 
associations, formal education, and guarded career paths) is encouraged as chosen executives 
“view problems in a similar fashion, see the same policies, procedures, and structures as 
normatively sanctioned and legitimated, and approach decisions in much the same way.” 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983:152) However, more recent research has shown the influence on 
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institutional change or strategic change made by those organizations that top executives come 
from (Kraatz and Moore, 2002; Boeker, 1997; Pfeffer and Leblebici, 1973).  
 
Therefore, top executive hiring as an interorganizational relation decision is particularly 
interesting to better understand the motivations behind decisions about the formation of 
interorganizational relationships.  
 
Status as a Motive in Top Executive Hiring 
Organizational status is pursued by organizations because it has been found to be important not 
only to an organization’s performance outcomes but also to its interactions with other 
organizations. As noted above, Podolny and his coauthors found that high status provides signals 
for high quality, especially when uncertainty makes it difficult to evaluate the quality of an 
organization’s product or its performance. When an organization’s status is not known, research 
has also provided evidence that status cues are sought from the other organizations it affiliates or 
partners with (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Podolny and Phillips, 1996). Positive status 
signals are often interpreted and utilized to the benefit of organizations in terms of lowering their 
production costs, charging high premiums, gaining large market shares, and so on (Podolny, 
1994; Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000; Jensen, 2006). In choosing alliance partners, organizations 
also prefer those of higher status, which make them enter into strategic alliances at a higher rate 
(Stuart, 1998). In recruiting talent, young and poorly connected firms tend to hire veterans from 
more established companies (Rao and Drazin, 2002). 
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As discussed above, top executive hiring forms connections between organizations that can be 
used for status cues. Especially at the top level of an organization, top executives are symbolic 
bearers of organizational status (Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; House, 1993; King & Fine, 2000). 
Hiring top executives from outside and, furthermore, from which outside organizations provides 
signals to an organization’s key constituents, thereby influencing their subjective evaluations of 
the organization’s overall status. Therefore, when an organization considers hiring top executives 
from outside, it assesses not only the capabilities and experience of individual candidates but 
also evaluates the status of the organizations that its candidates have worked for. 
 
Therefore, top executive hiring is a possible route for organizations to move up the status 
hierarchy. Aside from hiring top executives or those of similar status in order to maintain its 
existing status, status-concerned organizations may have two different directions to choose from: 
hiring those of higher status (hiring up) or hiring those of lower status (hiring down). When firms 
collaborate with other organizations to complete some task or assignment, Castellucci and Ertug 
(2010) found that organizations that are relatively low, rather than high, in status will tend to 
devote more effort, time, and resources to this task or assignment. In their study, F1 teams often 
collaborate with engine manufacturers. When other factors are controlled, engine manufacturers 
that are low in status, i.e. organizations that, in the past, have collaborated only with teams that 
are not prestigious, are more likely than engine manufacturers that are high in status to frequently 
update or redesign their engines. That is, firms that are low in status are especially likely to gain 
resources and prestige if they satisfy firms that are high in status; hence, they often devote more 
effort to their collaborations with these firms.  
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However, many concerns arise for organizations hiring down when it comes to maintaining 
better performance or achieving higher status in the long run. At the individual level, Blau 
(1964) noted that if an individual associates with a person of higher status on an egalitarian basis, 
this rewards the individual with the possibility of raising his/her own. Blau (1964:133) 
continued, “[b]y the same token, an individual who regularly socializes with others of inferior 
prestige is in danger of being considered by the community to be on their level and, hence, of 
losing prestige.” 
 
As is the case with individuals, organizations are motivated to hire their top executives from 
others of higher status because of the positive signals emitted by such social interactions. As 
discussed before, hiring top executives is a symbolic act in a sense that it signals the status 
standing of an organization. In the case of top executive hiring, the status of the other 
organization from which an organization hires becomes a signal to its key constituents, thereby 
influencing their subjective evaluations of the organization’s overall quality in terms of 
hierarchical status. In selecting top executive candidates, the status standing of the organization 
that potential candidates work for is part of their credentials. When an organization hires 
someone from an organization of higher status, it might be driven to send signals to its 
membership and increase its legitimacy to higher status. Especially when the quality measure of 
an output is ambiguous, the status of a focal organization as the quality of its outputs as 
perceived by others are dependent on the status of other organizations with whom the focal 
organization interacts or associates (Podolny, 1993). In all, if an organization hires from another 
of higher status, its status may be elevated because others perceive it to be equivalent to the 
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higher status organization. Such inferences made by others are more common for organizations 
when the quality of its output is hard to evaluate.  
 
In this chapter, top executive hiring is examined as a distinct form of interorganizational relation. 
This research argues that organizational status plays an important role in interorganizational 
relations such as top executive hiring. The next chapter features the empirical context of U.S. 
higher education, and it also develops and tests the hypotheses within the specific context.  
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CHAPTER 4  
STUDY 1: CONTEXT, HYPOTHESES, AND ANALYSIS 
Following the last chapter, this chapter describes the empirical context of U.S. higher education 
and explains why this context fits the purpose of this research. More importantly, predictions are 
made about the relationship between organizational status and interorganizational relations such 
as top executive hiring in U.S. higher education. Resonating with the importance of middle status 
in research, this chapter also discusses the uniqueness of middle-status positions in top executive 
hiring decisions. In order to test the hypotheses, the measure of organizational status is 
developed. In the end, some preliminary results are presented. 
 
The Context: Presidential Hiring in U.S. Higher Education 
Presidential hiring in U.S. higher education refers to the hiring decisions and processes of top 
executive officers of an institution of higher education in the United States, i.e., U.S. college or 
university presidents and chancellors. The chief executive officer of a university or college in 
U.S higher education is commonly known as president. If there are several (sometimes quite a 
number of) branch campuses, the titles can be chancellor, dean, or chief executive officer 
instead. In day-to-day activities, the role for many college and university presidents varies from 
mediator to facilitator to consensus maker for issues both internal and external to the institution. 
Presidents in such a research setting are the top executives of focus in this study.  
 
This research examines the relationship between organizational status and top executive hiring in 
U.S. higher education over a period of 20 years, from 1987 to 2006. Higher education in the U.S. 
consists of over 1300 colleges and universities for post-secondary level education. It is one of the 
! 43!
largest higher education systems in the world, and it has built its prestige not only of strong 
funding and research as an entirety but in particular by embracing a good number of the world’s 
top colleges and universities.  
 
The higher-education context is appropriate for this study for the following reasons. First of all, 
the majority of presidential hires are external. According to a recent publication on American 
college presidents by American Council on Education (ACE report, Ross and Green, 2000), 
presidents of all types of colleges and universities are usually hired from another institution 
rather than from within the same institution. In other words, unlike most firms in the business 
world, universities and colleges often conduct external searches for future presidents instead of 
relying on internal promotions.  
 
Secondly, organizational status is of particular relevance in this context because the quality of 
higher education is more intangible and, in a sense, harder to evaluate. The historical legacy 
accrued by positive or negative reputational performance is more likely the basis of status 
standings when it comes to colleges and universities.  
 
Finally, U.S. higher education is also a highly stratified field in which executive hiring is 
consequentially more sensitive to status or categorical differences. For instance, the same ACE 
report also shows that it is uncommon for college presidents to shift between different types of 
institutions. Individuals who have worked at liberal arts colleges typically remain at liberal arts 
institutions. The same holds true for doctorate-granting, comprehensive, baccalaureate, or 
specialized institutions. These categories, provided by Carnegie Classification, not only serve as 
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the leading framework for describing institutional diversity in U.S. higher education but also 
provide an indicator of prestige for colleges and universities.  
 
Therefore, universities and colleges are more tuned into their organizational status standing in 
the context of U.S higher education. At the same time, the interorganizational relations created 
by top executive hiring in U.S. higher education provides us with an appropriate setting in which 
to examine the role of organizational status in relations alongside other influences to which  an 
organization is subject.  
 
For at least two more important reasons, this phenomenon of presidential hiring in U.S. higher 
education is unique from other types of interorganizational relations or other empirical contexts 
that may provide us more insights about status concerns. On the one hand, due to the extensive 
nature of the position, the search process to select a college or university president often involves 
a number of committee members with a vested interest and often takes an entire year or longer. 
On the other hand, ambiguity in quality makes universities and colleges more status conscious 
and more likely to engage in status seeking behaviors (Cohen and March, 1974). In the following 
discussions (see Chapter 6), this research develops context-specific hypotheses to further 
understand the role of organizational status in interorganizational relations. 
 
Status Predictions 
As noted above, organizational status is a motive for interorganizational relations, including top 
executive hiring. In order to send signals to the constituencies of its membership to a certain 
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status group or even better, to a higher status group, an organization is most likely to hire top 
executives from other organizations of equal status and if possible, from those of higher status.  
 
In U.S. higher education, organizational status is of particular importance because the quality of 
higher education is harder to evaluate. One key underlying assumption about the overall structure 
of status hierarchy is that organizations are embedded in a status structure that is not a perfectly 
closed system. In a closed status structure, like the traditional Indian caste system, status is 
ascribed, i.e. based on characteristics over which the individual has little or no control, such as 
race, sex, age, ethnicity, and family background. On the opposite end of the spectrum is an open 
status system in which status is achieved on the basis of individual performances: skills, 
knowledge, education, diligence, and tenacity. As organizational status defined as a mixture of 
ascription and achievement, most social structures in reality are somewhere in between open and 
closed systems, so organizational status hierarchy is both open and closed. In a structure where 
status is both ascribed and achieved, both unearned and earned, organizations have choices and 
are motivated to not only maintain their current status standing but also, more importantly, to 
achieve higher status when possible. However, it is not possible for all organizations to hire their 
top executives from those of higher status because not many individual candidates are willing to 
move down in their career. Therefore, organizations such as universities and colleges in higher 
education are motivated to seek higher status in hiring top executives from outside. Therefore, I 
propose: 
H1: Universities and colleges tend to hire top executives from others of equal or higher 
status and to avoid hiring from those of lower status.  
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However, how status positions make a difference in top executive hiring decisions is yet to be 
explored. In other words, among top-, middle-, and low-status organizations, which group is 
more likely to or not as likely to only hire from others of their own status? To address this 
question, deeper understandings of status mechanisms in a hierarchical context are required. 
Particular attention is focused on the middle-status group as compared with the high- and low-
status groups. 
 
The reason for the interest in middle-status organizations is simply because the middle status has 
always been the focus of status research in comparison with high and low status. There have 
been a great amount of efforts in addressing this middle vs. high and low distinction. Aside from 
mixed results about this phenomenon, some influential studies are often disappointing in their 
interpretation with a tendency of oversimplification. For example, Phillips and Zuckerman 
(2001) posited an inverted U-shape curve between conformity and status. High-status 
organizations have full confidence in their social standing and their identity, and they tend to 
lead in change or innovation. Meanwhile, because low-status organizations have nothing to lose 
and do not have the pressure or ability to defend their legitimacy or identity, they also tend to 
deviate from the norm. However, the anxiety of middle-status organizations drives them to 
conform to social norms for a secure place in their social status standing. Han (1994) examined 
the high level of isomorphism in auditor selections. He found that high-status firms differentiate 
themselves from their main competitors, that middle-status firms imitate what high status firms 
do, and that the low-status firms do neither. All of these socially differentiated behaviors lead to 
the size polarization of CPA firms and skewed market concentration within audit services. 
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As noted, organizations at each status position (except for the highest or the lowest) may have 
both choices—hiring up or hiring down—in the process of status building and maintaining. 
However, their tendency to hire up or down differs depending on their status positions. 
Compared to a high and low status organization, how the status of its associates is perceived by 
others matters more to an organization of middle status. Hiring down, which is associated with a 
lower-status organization, is for a middle status riskier than for a high and low status 
organization. Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) argued that middle-status organizations are on the 
dividing line of a desirable designation, somewhere between the inside and outside. For a high-
status organization, when it hires its top executive from a different status organization, its status 
standing is probably not endangered because it has been secured or fixed over time. Most likely, 
such a move to hire down for high status organizations is viewed as harvesting the most capable 
candidates from lower status organizations at a lower cost (Castellucci and Ertug, 2010). A low-
status organization is probably not motivated to hire top executives from higher-status 
organizations because it has to pay premium for a questionable status gain in the eyes of the 
others.  
 
Jensen and Roy (2008) argue that accountability holds organizations to justify their status-related 
decisions to their related parties. Accountability also triggers status anxiety of losing their current 
status (Jensen, 2006). Middle-status organizations are those that lack a clear status signal in the 
eyes of its audience (Phillips and Zuckerman, 2001). The lack of clear status positioning may 
cause middle-status organizations more anxious to make connections for a positive cue to their 
status. Therefore, to choose to hire up for an immediate status cue is often preferred in 
comparison to hiring down for a long-term performance-based status building process. For this 
! 48!
reason, organizations of middle status, in comparison with lower-status organizations, often are 
willing to pay more for candidates from higher status organizations, whereas organizations of 
high status are in an advantageous position because they do not have to do so.  Henceforth, I 
propose a curvilinear relationship between a university or college’s status position and its 
tendency to hire up rather than to hire down.  
H2: Universities and college of middle status are more likely to hire top executives from 
others of higher status than high and low status organizations and to avoid hiring from 
those of lower status. 
 
Status Measure 
In order to test these above hypotheses, a measure of organizational status is to be developed in 
the context of U.S. higher education. This research begins with the definition and key relations of 
organizational status, creating a most appropriate measure that serves the purposes of this 
inquiry. Because this measure lays a foundation for the following empirical analysis, a great 
amount of theoretical and empirical efforts are made to address possible concerns or challenges, 
including a thorough review of status measure in literature (see Table 4.1) and extensive 
correlations with alternative status measures for robustness check. 
 
In the previous discussions, organizational status is defined as the prestige accorded to an 
organization on the basis of its hierarchical position in a social structure that goes beyond its 
observable economic performance, i.e., “a mixture of ascription and achievement.” From this 
definition, we first know that organizational status is not only path-dependent and historically 
inherited but also possibly subject to changes in reputational performances. In other words, 
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organizational status is an ascription of the past as well as an achievement for current 
performances and future expectations.  
 
More importantly, organizational status as “accorded” prestige is given or determined by others 
that an organization is associated with in a social structure. In order to capture organizational 
status theoretically and empirically, it is essential to study the relations that an organization 
chooses or is chosen to be in. Theoretically, organizational status flows or is exchanged in 
associations and connections where status is expendable capital, or when one’s loss is the other’s 
gain (Blau, 1964). On the other hand, past research has empirically demonstrated that one 
organization’s status is reflected by the status of the other organizations with which it affiliates 
or partners (Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels, 1999; Podolny and Phillips, 1996). 
 
Therefore, social relations are key for examining organizational status. Moreover, those social 
relations that determine organizational status are not just any but are differentiating and 
relatively stable over time. These relations are like “prisms,” a differentiation device that splits 
up the entirety of a group into strata while emitting signals to related parties (Podolny, 2001). For 
example, those relations of no order or ranking, like memberships for those organizations that 
belong to the same association, do not help in determining their organizational status. Only when 
a difference between insiders and outsiders is caused by such membership can that membership 
be used to help us understand organizational status.  
 
Meanwhile, organizational status is relatively stable over time because it reproduces itself 
through the social relations in which an organization enters. This stock-like stickiness in 
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organizational status is partially due to a separation between performance and status. In reality, 
an organization chooses with whom it is associated or being chosen from by others. The related 
parties in those relations reproduce their status positions in those choices. The choices will or 
may not be adjusted immediately after a change in performance. Over time such relations show 
relatively stable patterns.  
 
All together, the goal in finding a measure for organizational status is now to identify stable and 
differentiating patterns in social relations that involve directional or hierarchical positioning of 
an organization’s past, present, and future performances. Building upon the concept of 
organizational status, our next step is to find what social relations we are going to focus on or 
who the related parties are in such social relations. Table 2 provides a list of status measures used 
in recent status research.   
 
In the context of U.S. universities and colleges, an American university is known to be “so many 
different things to so many different people.” A measure of organizational status therefore points 
to a positivistic multi-dimensional approach, focusing on those differentiating relations. The 
movement of people in colleges and universities along three dimensions—students, research, and 
sports (Brewer, Gates, and Goldman, 2002)—provides the best guide to organizational status. In 
higher education, student enrollment along the dimension of the movement of students is one of 
the most important indicators of organizational status.  
 
Nonetheless, one specific differentiating factor is mostly targeted for a specific audience. For 
instance, the three sources of college reputation/prestige—teaching, research, and sports—are 
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weighted differently to prospective/current students, faculty/administrative staff, and 
coaches/players. However, the fact that status varies among different audiences does not 
discourage efforts from being centered on one or more sources that may determine 
organizational status.  
 
In higher education, student enrollment at a university or college consists of three key 
components: 1) Application: Students provide information requested by the university/college 
for the purposes of establishing and administering academic and financial relationships that exist 
between the university/college and its students; 2) Registration: Students register for courses and 
provide information needed to assess fees and tuition; 3) Payment of fees: Students must pay all 
assessed tuition and other special fees and satisfy all due and/or delinquent amounts payable to 
the university/college. Therefore, student enrollment is essentially the academic and financial 
relationship between the university/college and the students.  
 
More importantly, student enrollment is a differentiating and stable relationship. The 
differentiation starts with the admission process: both students and universities/colleges are 
differentiating and selecting each other. For instance, any high school student only applies for a 
certain number of universities and colleges, most likely does not get accepted to all the 
universities and colleges, and eventually only chooses one university or college to attend. And 
vice versa, a university or college receives a multitude of student applications and only offers 
admission to certain students.  
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To evaluate the differentiation, a variety of measures are used for enrollment profiles, e.g. 
gender, race, admission rate, acceptance rate, and retention rate. These measures indicate how 
students of different attributes are drawn to different universities and colleges. Among them, the 
geographic profile of enrolled students represents the student-drawing power of a university or 
college from different geographic locations. Usually it is examined at the level of states, U.S. 
territories, and foreign countries.  
 
The boundaries between in-state, out-of-state, and international colleges and universities are 
firmly entrenched by the different motivations of students and by the different criteria used in 
admissions at universities and colleges.  Financially, students pay less for in-state schools than 
out-of-state schools, and much more so when they are international students. Aside from the 
factor of tuitions and fees and living expenses, we expect that the students choose the best 
possible universities when they apply for out-of-state universities and colleges. This is often the 
case for international students. Therefore, on the one hand, students are being selected to their 
best matches through their application and admission process. On the other hand, a university or 
college is able to recruit its students from each state (besides the state where its campus is 
located) in the United States and internationally, which means that its national/international 
influence is stronger than a university or college that remains in its home state or country. 
 
In all, organizational status is here measured as geographic dispersion of student enrollment in 
universities and colleges. My assumption is that if a university or college is able to recruit its 
students from each state (besides the state where its campus is located) in the United States and 
internationally, its national/international influence is stronger than a university or college that 
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remains in its home state or region. To measure the geographic dispersion of student enrollment, 
I introduce an economic measure, the Herfindahl Index, which is often used to measure 
competition within various industries by measuring the amount of market share that each firm 
has in reference to total market share for that good. A higher measure of this index generally 
means that there is less competition. Its values are between 0 and 1.  
 
In the case of student enrollment, the Herfindahl Index is calculated by the squared percentage of 
students from each state, U.S. territories, or foreign countries. The higher it is, the more students 
are from one or a few locations, i.e. most likely in-state or within the region. Conversely, the 
lower it is, the more evenly geographically distributed the enrolled students are. Therefore, 
organizational status of universities and colleges can be calculated as 1 subtracted from the 
Herfindahl Index of geographic dispersion of student enrollment. The more the value is, the 
higher organizational status is and vice versa.  
 
TABLE 4.1 A LIST OF STATUS MEASURES IN LITERATURE 
References Context Status Measures 
Benjamin and 
Podolny, 1999.  
California wineries that account for 
90% of all U.S. wine production 
(1980-1991) 
Wineries affiliated with formally 
recognized regions or appellations 
to increase their status, in addition 
to their own geographic locations 
Castellucci and 
Ertug, 2010. 
F1 formula racing from 1993 to 
1999. 
The residuals obtained by 
regressing press mentions (in 
Lexis-Nexis for yearly article 
counts the term “Formula One.”) 
for a race team on the total points 
scored by a team for each yearly 
cross-section.  
Fombrun and 
Shanley. 1990.  
1985 Fortune MAC 292 firms.   Model performance (current & 
past), risk, inst’l signals (e.g. 
ownership, social resp., media 
visibility), strategic signals 
(advertising; diversification) !
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D'Aveni, 1996. The input (students and new 
faculty) and output (MBA and PhD 
students) in 20 business schools 
Status was drawn from several 
surveys to determine each 
constituency's degree of admiration 
for the focal school (academic 
rankings, national business 
community ranking, and student 
ranking). 
Gould, 2002.  Three studies: verbal 
communication in task groups or 
various sizes, interaction of 
quintuplets between age 2 and 3, 
friendliness ranking among 
residential fraternity 
Euclidean distance as a measure of 
role dissimilarity. The further two 
actors are from each other in status, 
the more they differ in their 
patterns of attachment to others. 
Han, 1994.  1984 publicly listed U.S. firms and 
their CPA firms (auditor-client 
pairs) 
Absolute size of the firms and Big 4 
(vs. other CPA firms) 
Jensen and Roy, 
2008.  
New auditor's choice after the 
collapse of Arthur Anderson for 
900 U.S. companies 
Big four 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers,Deloitte 
& Touche, KPMG, and Ernst & 
Young) vs. others 
Jensen, 2006.  Event history analysis of defection 
after the collapse of 2002 Arthur 
Anderson  
Ownership of public pension funds, 
the coverage of security analysts, 
NYSE standing, WSJ media 
coverage, size, interlocking firms, 
higher fee payment 
Jensen, 2008.  The entrance of commercial banks 
to nonconvertible corporate bonds 
issued by U.S. publicly listed 
nonfinancial firms in 1991-1997 
Similar to Podolny's method, yearly 
underwriting management networks 
in bond market/syndicate lending 
(>.85 high, <.10 low) 
Keith, 1999.  Three surveys (1970 Roose and 
Anderson, 1982 Conference Board, 
and 1995 NRC) of departmental 
prestige 
Scholarly publications/citations per 
faculty, gini coefficient for 
departmental publications/citations, 
faculty number, graduate student 
enrollment, proportion of highly 
rated departments 
Lounsbury, 
2002.  
All professional and business 
finance associations in existence 
between 1945-1993 
The founding rate of professional 
finance associations represents the 
likelihood of status mobility. 
Metiu, 2006.  U.S. and Indian software engineer 
teams working on the same project 
The deepening of status hierarchy 
through informal channels, i.e. lack 
of communication, use of 
geographic distance, criticism, etc. 
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Podolny and 
Phillips, 1996.  
Non-investment grade market 
underwritten by investment banks 
(1981 and 1987) 
Bonacich's power centrality using 
the announcements of security 
offerings that appear in major 
business newspapers. 
Podolny, 1993.  Investment grade debt market 
underwritten by investment banks 
(1982- 1987) 
Bonacich's power centrality using 
the announcements of security 
offerings that appear in major 
business newspapers. 
Phillips and 
Zuckerman, 
2001.  
Two datasets: Silicon Valley law 
firms; security analysts depending 
on the status of their affiliated 
banks 
Middle status is on the social 
boundary that divides the members 
and nonmembers of a desirable 
social designation. Law firm status 
is operationalized as the proportion 
of the firm attorneys from top six 
elite law schools. Bank status is the 
mean status ranking by Institutional 
Investor. 
Sauder, 2006.  A qualitative study of law school 
rankings by U.S. News and World 
Report 
The introduction of a third-party 
status system by USNWR in top, 
2nd to 4th tier law schools and its 
influence on law school 
administrators/faculty/students/pros
pective students. 
Sauder, 2008.  Interviews about law school 
rankings by U.S. News and World 
Report and the interorganizational 
relationship in the field 
The introduction of a third-party 
status system by USNWR and the 
transformation of institutional 
logics. 
Stuart, Hoang, 
and Hybels, 
1999.  
301 dedicated biotechnology firms 
specializing in-vitro diagnostics and 
therapeutics and the endorsements 
they received from 1978-1991 
The prominence of partners is 
evaluated in strategic alliance 
network and patent citation 
network, using a degree centrality 
network measure. 
Washington and 
Zajac, 2005.  
NCAA Basketball: The Official 
College Basketball Records Books 
(1989-1996) 
The likelihood of receiving the 
invitation to participate the NCAA 
postseason basketball tournament. 
Wegener, 1992. Review of status concept and 
measure: a hierarchy of positions 
(as dominant); social closure 
(psychological scaling of status 
awareness as emerging) 
Individual level: social standing, 
value to society, power, skill, 
degree of autonomy, desirability, 
etc. 
 
First, the geographic distribution of fall student enrollment is calculated by Herfindahl index. Its 
formula is: 
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where  is the percentage of student enrollment from state  and  is the number of states 
plus international students. The value of H is between 0 and 1. The closer it is to zero, the more 
student-drawing power a university or college has to draw students because its student body is 
widely dispersed nationally and internationally. Vice versa, the closer it is to one, the less power 
a university or college has because its student body is mostly from one state or region.  
 
Second, the above Herfindahl index is normalized as below: 
!
where again, N is the number of states plus international students, and H is the Herfindahl Index 
of student enrollment, as calculated above. Whereas the Herfindahl index ranges from 1/N to 
one, the normalized Herfindahl index ranges from 0 to 1. 
 
Finally, organizational status is defined as below: 
 
where !is the normalized Herfindahl Index of student enrollment. In this way, organizational 
status manifests itself in student drawing power. In other words, a university or college that 
recruits its students from widely dispersed geographic regions has higher organizational status 
and, vice versa, lower organizational status. 
 
For robustness check, a number of correlations were run between this measure and other status 
measures, traditionally accepted as at least partially reflecting organizational status. Such 
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alternative measures include U.S. News and World Report Rankings, Peterson’s selectivity 
scores, and others (as detailed in the description of data sources in Chapter 6). To further check 
its validity, this measure is also calculated only on the basis of all the states and outlying 
territories in America, excluding international students because their recruiting and enrollment 
processes are subject to very different considerations both from the students and from the 
universities and colleges. From these above exploratory efforts, this measure continues to stand 
strong and be reliable in comparison with others. Therefore, the measure of organizational status 
as the inverse of student geographic dispersion is created and used in this research. 
 
Status Difference and Preliminary Results 
To run the empirical test, status difference is introduced as the difference between  the 
organizational status ( ) and origin’s organizational status ( ) (c.f. Gould, 2002; Podolny and 
Philips, 1996; Podolny, 1993). In order to capture the direction of hiring up or down and how far 
an organization goes up or down in status hierarchy, status difference is employed here to 
describe the difference of actors with respect to their own statuses (Blau, 1977; McPherson and 
Smith-Lovin, 1987; Phillips, Rothbard, and Dumas, 2009). Specifically, status difference refers 
to the distance of organizational status between the organization that hires a new top executive 
from outside and the organization from which this new top executive comes. In 
operationalization, status difference between the focal and origin organizations (by Euclidean 
distance matrices: a) uses pairwise calculation, and b) takes care of the concern over the two 
directions from mean, +/-). This method is often used in network studies. For example, Gould 
(2002) used it to support his argument that the further two actors are from each other in status, 
the more they differ in their patterns of attachment to others. In this research, status difference is 
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calculated with the origin’s organizational status subtracted from the focal’s organizational 
status.  
 
To test H1, in which organizations are argued to hire top executives from others of equal or 
higher status and to avoid hiring those from lower status, a t-statistic test is run for status 
difference between the focal and origin organization’s status. Specifically, the mean is used to 
run t-test here. In the meantime, the other two kinds of averages, mode and median, are also run 
for a robustness check. Due to ceiling and flooring effects, I have excluded the bottom and top 
status organizations in the data. In the meantime, I also use status measure and selectivity scores 
for the focal and origin organizations to run linear regression to demonstrate strong positive 
association between the origin’s and focal’s organizational status.  
 
In order to test H2, which is about whether middle-status organizations are more likely to hire 
top executives from others of higher status than high and low status organizations, three separate 
dummy variables are calculated based on the focal’s organizational status. First I look at the sum 
and standard deviation of organizational status for the overall sample. Then organizations are 
labeled as middle-status organizations if their status is within one standard deviation of the mean. 
If its status value is above one standard deviation of the mean, it is defined as high status; 
otherwise, low status if it is below the value of the mean subtracted from one standard deviation. 
To cross check the validity of these status groups, I also group the organizations into different 
status groups by even percentile of the focal’s organizational status, depending on its 
distribution. Then, for further support, I run correlation between this measure and the five-point 
measure of a college’s overall selectivity in admissions, which was obtained from Peterson’s 
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Guide to Colleges (see Chapter 6 for details). I also run regression on the focal organization’s 
status and include a squared term to test the more specific argument that middle-status colleges 
would be more status-conscious in top executive hiring decisions.  
 
Hypothesis 1 is supported through t-test of status difference between the origin’s and focal’s 
organizational status. Due to ceiling and flooring effects, I have excluded the bottom and top 
status organizations in the data. That is, in some cases, if the focal organization’s status is as low 
as 0, I take them out because these organizations cannot hire further down; in other cases, if the 
focal organization’s status is as high as 1, I also remove them because these organizations cannot 
further hire up. In spite of the smaller number of cases, this proves to be a more conservative test 
for the hypotheses about the role of organizational status. In addition, other tests over mode and 
median were run. The additional tests about mode does not provide much information because 
they are all zero while the results on median are consistent with what shows in Table 4.2. From 
Table 4.2, the t statistics are significant at the level of .05 (two-tailed) for status difference across 
the sample. This also shows that status difference at high and low levels of organizational status 
is statistically significant for their tendency to hire down (it is much smaller size of tendency for 
high status though than that of low status), whereas middle status organizations show the 
opposite tendency. This table also provides at least partial support for H2, that middle-status 
organizations are more status conscious in their top executive hiring decisions in comparison 
with high and low status organizations (Chapter 6 further tests H2 in Model 1 and 2).  
TABLE 4.2 T TEST FOR STATUS DIFFERENCE 
Status difference # of Cases Mean S.D. t statistics 
All 780 0.023 0.011 2.12 
High Status 219 -0.026 0.013 -1.96 
Middle Status 458 0.211 0.019 11.15 
Low Status 103 -0.239 0.025 -9.66 
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To supplement the above analysis, the regressions of the origin’s status on the focal’s status (not 
presented here) also demonstrate strong positive association between the origin’s and focal’s 
organizational status. The results provide further evidence that the focal and origin’s status are 
positively associated and that consequently, universities and colleges have the general tendency 
to hire up instead of hiring down. The regression also presents a strong negative coefficient for 
the squared term of the focal organizational status, indicating middle status organizations are 
more status-concerned.  
 
All in all, Study 1 (as in Chapter 3 and 4) focuses on the role of organizational status in top 
executive hiring decisions. Organizational status is found an important motive in the formation 
of interorganizational relations. Study 2 in the next two chapters turns to the factors that may 
make organizations more or less status concerned in interorganizational relation formation 
decisions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
STUDY 2: A DECISION-MAKING APPROACH TO STATUS CONCERNS  
IN INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS 
As argued in the previous chapters, organizational status plays an important role in an 
organization’s strategic decisions about interorganizational relations, such as top executive 
hiring. In Chapter 2, organizational status was reviewed as a new but powerful motive for 
interorganizational relations with limited empirical evidence. Correspondingly, Chapter 3 and 4 
henceforth demonstrate the role of organizational status in the specific empirical context of top 
executive hiring. However, this research is aimed to study not only the role of organizational 
status but, more importantly, to discover to what degree organizations are concerned with 
organizational status in decisions about interorganizational relations. In a more general sense, 
status concerns in the formation of interorganizational relations are affected by a range of 
different factors that motivate organizations to enter into relationships with others. For instance, 
firms may enter strategic alliances for knowledge or resources, but research has provided 
evidence that firms may also be motivated to get associated with high-status partners to elevate 
their own status. It is both theoretically and empirically important to examine how the concerns 
about organizational status are factored into the decisions in terms of when and with whom 
organizations form relationships. 
 
Addressing the latter purpose of this research, this chapter therefore continues to examine when 
or under what circumstances organizational status is more or less of a concern in the formation of 
interorganizational relations, such as top executive hiring. Drawing on the decision-making 
theory of organizations (March, 1994; Simon, 1947; Cyert and March, 1963), this research 
focuses on the process of how interorganizational relation decisions are made. Taking the 
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decision-making approach, this research introduces the concept of status consciousness and 
proposes a model of status consciousness. The model of status consciousness is consisted of 
political dynamics and peer comparisons. It examines the conflict and politics of multiple actors 
with inconsistent preferences and then discusses the interpretation and ambiguity that arises 
when peer comparisons about identity and category come into the picture. Finally, hypotheses 
are developed in the context of U.S. higher education.  
 
A Decision Making Approach 
In order to understand why some organizations are more concerned with their status than the 
others in their decisions about interorganizational relations, this research turns to the decision-
making theory for answers. In the last chapters, organizational status is argued to play an 
important role when organizations form relationships with other organizations through a variety 
of ways, including top executive hiring. However, the formation of interorganizational relations 
is a decision-making process in which all other factors in relations with organizational status 
come to bear. In the case of top executive hiring, if organizational status were the only 
determinant or the most important factor among all in these decisions, as assumed in most status 
research, organizations would be at the risk of being only for “looking good or better” instead of 
finding the most competent and desirable candidate. Therefore, it is important to explore 
variability in the degree to which organizations are affected by organizational status in their 
decisions about interorganizational relations.  
 
The theory of organizational decisions (March, 1994; Simon, 1947; Cyert and March, 1963) 
sheds light on our understanding about the role of organizational status for two reasons. First of 
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all, when and with whom organizations enter relationships are important strategic decisions that 
organizations make. As noted above, organizations gain access to information and knowledge, 
resources and capabilities, legitimacy and status, and so on. Decisions about interorganizational 
relations are of strategic importance to organizational performance and survival. Second, 
decision-making theory provides an answer in terms of how organizations weigh a variety of 
factors in their decision-making process, especially when they are not aligned with one another 
in decisions about choosing partners with which to form an interorganizational relation. 
Decisions about interorganizational relations are no different from any other decisions in terms 
of following the general decision-making rule. Understanding any decision about 
interorganizational relations requires concrete knowledge of the contexts in which historical, 
social, political, and economic factors all come into the play. By focusing on this process, the 
theory of decision-making is greatly applicable for a better understanding of interorganizational 
relationship formation. 
 
This decision-making approach is fundamentally different from the contingency approach for 
overarching frameworks (Oliver, 1990; Galaskiewicz, 1985; Brass and others, 2004). In 
contingency approach tradition, scholars have attempted to map the motivations of 
interorganizational relations into decisions about when and with whom to form a relationship. 
For example, Oliver (1990) proposed a set of determinants of interorganizational relationship 
formation and applied them to the predictions of different types of interorganizational relations. 
These critical contingencies include necessity, asymmetry, reciprocity, efficiency, stability and 
legitimacy, which motivate organizations to enter into relationships with one another. In this 
seminal work, organizations are assumed to have choices, are conscious, and make intentional 
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decisions for their own purposes. In a more recent work, Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, and Tsai 
(2004) looked at the conditions that promote the formation of interorganizational relations and 
identified conditions that facilitate organizations’ cooperation, such as experience, trust, norms, 
equity, and context. However, such ambitious frameworks have fallen short of empirical support 
and are often criticized for that reason.  
 
The current approach to decision-making looks into the process of how a decision about 
interorganizational relationship is made. It extends the investigation further to those 
circumstances under which organizations are to a greater or lesser degree subject to 
organizational status concerns.  That is, in order to further the argument that organizational status 
plays an important role, it is theoretically and empirically important and also interesting to 
identify important factors that affect the propensity of organizations to form interorganizational 
relations in order to maintain and build organizational status. The advantage of this approach is 
to build understanding about status concerns in interorganizational relations incrementally, both 
in theory and through empirical supports.   
 
The Concept of Status Consciousness 
To capitalize on the theory of decision-making, this research introduces the concept of status 
consciousness. Status consciousness means the degree to which status considerations are 
important in an organization’s decisions, the extent to which an organization is concerned about 
its own relative status, and, in particular, which status concerns tend to “color” its interaction 
with others (Blalock, 1959; Anderson and Cunningham, 1972; Kaufman, 1957).  
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This concept originated in sociological tradition. At the individual level, Blalock (1959) 
described an ideal-type model of the highly status-conscious person. For Blalock, this person is 
one who adheres “religiously” to the values of his/her group and who has high status aspirations. 
He/she is careful to learn the proper etiquette and to join the right organizations. In his/her 
interpersonal relations, he/she associates with those people who are in positions to help him/her 
maintain or advance toward the top, shunning those who are beneath his/her in status. In 
summary, an extremely status-conscious person “lives and acts as though status considerations 
are of the utmost importance” and they are to this person “the essence of social interaction” 
(Blalock, 1959:243). Derived from the conceptualization of status consciousness at the 
individual level, it is important to note that status consciousness in this research is not an actor’s 
trait but a property of the decision-making process. In other words, one organization may display 
a different degree of status consciousness in different types of decisions, including their 
interactions with other organizations.  
 
To conceptualize status consciousness in a decision-making process has two important 
implications in the study of interorganizational relations. First, status consciousness becomes 
observable and measurable when organizations enter relationships with others. As sociologists 
observed status-conscious behaviors of individuals, organizations similarly make their choices 
when they take organizational status into consideration in relations with other important factors. 
Status consciousness is thus not elusive but can be captured in the decisions and actions of an 
organization. Second, given the strategic importance of organizational status, status 
consciousness acknowledges that organizational status is only one of the many factors that may 
affect decisions about interorganizational relations. Focusing on the organizational decision-
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making process, a study of status consciousness provides insights about when and how 
organizations are more or less concerned with organizational status.  
 
A Model for Status Consciousness in Interorganizational Relations 
As status consciousness is conceptualized in this decision-making process, this research focuses 
on the process of decision-making, or how organizations are more or less concerned with their 
status in their decisions about interorganizational relations. Following the approach of 
organizational decision-making, a model of status consciousness is proposed here to understand 
status concerns in interorganizational relations.  
 
Informed by the organizational theory of decision-making (March, 1994; Cyert and March, 
1963), a model of status consciousness in interorganizational relations is developed in search for 
a better understanding of when and how organizations are concerned with their status. In his 
primer on decision-making, March (1994) began with a description of the decision-making 
process, during which an organization as a single entity may follow different logics, i.e. a logic 
of rationality or a logic of appropriateness, may have a range of goals demanding different 
actions, and may have its own preferences and priorities over their choices. As has been argued 
in the previous chapters, status consciousness varies in the decision-making process about 
interorganizational relations due to the multiplicity of logics, goals, and preferences for any 
organization.  
Moreover, this model of status consciousness in interorganizational relations complicates the 
above decision-making process in two ways. First, status consciousness involves multiple 
interests and parties inside and outside of the organizations, which generate a battlefield for 
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politics and powers. March (1994) introduced decision-making processes with the fact that an 
organization is made of multiple parties and interests. These multiple parties have their own 
preferences, and their preferences are often inconsistent and sometimes at odds with one another. 
Henceforth, politics and power are needed to resolve and align these conflicting and colliding 
interests. Therefore, the model in this research brings in the multiple parties that are involved in 
organizational decision-making process. As organizations are increasingly viewed as open 
systems, decisions about interorganizational relations are influenced by multiple parties and 
interests within and among organizations. It is therefore most interesting to explore how or when 
more weight is given to status concerns in decisions about interorganizational relations, given the 
different status preferences of the involved parties and the interests inside and outside of the 
organizations.  
 
Moreover, the model of status consciousness in interorganizational relations takes into account 
confusion, interpretation, and complexity in the decision-making process. Ambiguity invites 
varied interpretations, especially when the situations cannot be coded mutually exhaustive and 
exclusive categories. March added ambiguity to the decision-making process, by which he means 
there is “a lack of clarity or consistency in reality, causality or intentionality” (March, 1994:178). 
Building on these insights, this research focuses on the role of organizational status and explores 
how organizational status plays an important role when multiple interests and ambiguities are 
involved. 
 
To sum up, this chapter builds on the core argument that the formation of interorganizational 
relations is a decision making process. Informed by organizational theory of decision-making, 
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the concept of status consciousness is derived. Moreover, the model of status consciousness is 
developed with the help of organizational decision-making approach. Chapter 6 provides more 
context-specific discussions about the model, especially in political dynamics and peers 
comparisons.  
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CHAPTER 6   
STUDY 2: HYPOTHESES AND ANALYSIS 
Following the tradition of decision-making, this research employs the concept of status 
consciousness to introduce political dynamics and peer comparisons to answer the question of 
when organizations are more concerned with their status in interorganizational relations, such as 
top executive hiring decision. In the following discussions, this research develops hypotheses for 
political dynamics and peer comparison separately in terms of the phenomenon of top executive 
hiring in the context of U.S. higher education.  
 
Political Dynamics 
This section focuses on multiplicity and dependency in political dynamics for a better 
understanding of status consciousness. Multiplicity of constituents refers to the varied parties 
involved in the decision making process that may have conflicting interests. What multiplicity 
brings out is not the nominal number of parties involved, but that these different parties play 
different roles in maintaining the existing order and are involved at different intensity levels 
within internal conflict. Dependency examines how strongly an organization is dependent on a 
specific interest parties. The dependence of organizations on a certain party allows this party to 
have a more influential voice in organizational decisions and actions. 
 
In U.S. higher education, universities and colleges have two important internal parties, and the 
interests and claims of these two parties are closely related to organizational status: faculty and 
administrators. Faculty and administrative personnel are two internal groups whose values and 
identities diverge (Kraatz, Ventresca, and Deng, 2010). In comparison, faculty members are 
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more professionalized and less status-driven because of the professionalization and socialization 
process (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 2002). On the contrary, administrators, who deal 
with day-to-day business, tend to be more status-conscious (Kraatz et al., 2010). Both old and 
new institutional perspectives acknowledge the importance of professionalization as the 
normative isomorphic pressure. Selznick (1957) furthered pointed out that professionalism, as a 
source for a broader sense of responsibility, needs to be balanced with internal conflict in 
organizations. The more professionalized an internal interest party is, the more likely it is to 
pursue institutional integrity, despite the challenges from other interest parties. Ocasio (1994, 
1999; Ocasio and Kim, 1999) highlighted the institutionalization of power as a political process 
in which powerful individuals and groups entrench themselves in formal positions and increase 
their control over others. One way to protect or claim their power is to proliferate in number, 
because the intricate power balance may be tipped over as the size of one internal group is 
outnumbered by those of other groups.  
 
Building on the above insights, I predict that organizations will be more likely to be status-
conscious when the internal elites who are active in status maintaining and building dominant 
positions over the others. In particular, I use the ratio of the number of faculty to administrators 
to evaluate the power balance between these two parties. Therefore, the more dominant faculty 
are in organizations and/or the less dominant administrators are, the less likely status maintaining 
and building is manifested in top executive hiring. 
H3: Universities and colleges with large ratios of faculty to administrators tend to hire 
presidents from others of higher status than from those of lower status. 
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Podolny (1993: 831) conceptualized status as “a signal of underlying quality of a firm’s 
products”. Status-driven behaviors, in nature, view organizational status as a mediating strategic 
step in a cycle of social and economic resource acquisition. Lin's discussion of how individuals 
go about improving their status represents this perspective. He defines striving for higher status 
as "the process by which individuals mobilize and invest resources for returns in socioeconomic 
standing" (2001:78). Individuals therefore pursue status because it gives them access to greater 
economic and social resources, and they use economic and social resources to improve their 
status. To realize such benefits for a preferred status standing of an organization, the key internal 
constituents are those who deal with the organization’s customers/clients. When uncertainty and 
ambiguity make it impossible to evaluate an organization’s quality, its customers/clients mainly 
rely on status signals instead so that the importance of organizational status is elevated and the 
organization’s motives for higher organizational status are also amplified (Podolny, 1994; 
Chung, Singh, and Lee, 2000; Jensen, 2006).  
 
The internal constituents interfacing with their customers/clients understand this best, and the 
elevation of their power or positions in organizations indicates dependence on status evaluations 
from their customers/clients. In a study by Kraatz et al. (2010), enrollment management is 
examined as an organizational structure that involves the integration of various administrative 
functions, such as the admissions and financial aid offices that may affect enrollments and tuition 
revenues.  This structural change is highlighted by the creation of a new administrative position, 
typically titled “Vice President for Enrollment Management.” The purpose of adopting this EM 
VP position is “to enable increased coordination between admissions, financial aid, and other 
enrollment-relevant functions.” (Kraatz, et al., 2010:1522) The creation a high-level position 
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indicates that organizations are willing to cater to their customers/clients, who are often overly 
concerned with organizational status.  
 
Therefore, I hypothesize that if an organization increases its dependency on a certain group for 
status concerns, it is more likely to hire its top executives from those of higher status. 
H4: Universities and colleges that have increased their dependency on a certain group 
(adopted EM VP positions) tend to hire presidents from others of higher status more than 
from those of lower status. 
 
External constituents may impose laws or regulations on, set expectations to, and instill taken-
for-grantedness in organizations (Oliver, 1991). Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) argued that 
organizations facing incompatible and competing demands may find it difficult to conform to the 
environment because the satisfaction to one external constituent may mean ignoring or defying 
the others. Generally speaking, the more parties that are involved, the more complicated the 
internal conflict is expected to be (Oliver, 1991). Therefore, organizations with more demanding 
external constituents or external constituents with more incompatible demands or expectations 
are more likely to hire top executives from other organizations of higher status as their way of 
responding to status pressures. 
 
Similar to what I find in the discussion on internal constituents, the multiplicity of and 
dependency on external constituents make an organization more or less status conscious in top 
executive hiring. I start with the role of the demanding external constituents and focus on how 
organizations become more or less status conscious under the influence of certain external 
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constituents on which they depend on, in the case of this research, the government and the 
market. Here I focus on the government and the market because these involvements may be 
incompatible with the existing organizational/institutional values and goals and, at the same time, 
they are probably (but not necessarily) at odds with each other. In terms of the government, this 
research emphasizes the demanding requirements for government funding. For dependence on 
the market, I examine two specific factors in the context of U.S. higher education: enrollment 
economy and professional program adoption.  
 
Although the government (federal, state, and local) in most cases plays a secondary role in 
supporting and financing U.S. higher education, this role remains quite substantial and continues 
to shape the entire higher education landscape, especially for public universities and colleges 
(U.S. National Advisory Committee on Education, 1931). The government invests in higher 
education mainly in the following two ways. First, the government supports and directs higher 
education by assuring access to postsecondary education and sustaining basic and applied 
research that is in the public interest. Second, the government provides support via direct or 
indirect funding, regulation of funded activities, and mandates to related public agencies.  
 
From the above description, the goals and values of the government to a large degree echo what 
higher education institutions may hold dear in their missions. However, the necessary 
requirements for universities and colleges to receive financial support are so demanding that they 
are forced to cater externally to the government and to stay attuned to what the government 
attends to. The federal, state, and local government all do not directly get involved with the 
actual operations. Their fund allocation is not based on the measure of organizational status but 
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more of a range of mixed political or economical factors, including enrollment (need-based or 
merit-based assistantship), faculty (number and their achievement), etc. As a result, the federal, 
state and local government is less sensitive to status signals sent out by universities and colleges. 
As I emphasize in my discussion of top executive hiring, the linkages created by such hiring are 
possibly a shortcut to the elevation of organizational status. Instead of becoming more status-
conscious, universities and organizations that are getting more financial support from 
government are, therefore, less likely to be status conscious and to hire their top executives from 
above.  
H5: Universities and colleges that rely more on government support are less likely to hire 
presidents from others of higher status than from those of lower status. 
 
In a study of enrollment management by Kraatz et al. (2010), organizations are found to be more 
likely to adopt “value-subverting” innovations when they are more dependent on external 
resource pressure. Enrollment management (EM frequently hereafter) is an administrative 
structure and a set of accompanying practices that have come into wide use over the past two 
decades (Hossler, 1984; 2004; Dolence, 1998).  The structural element of EM involves the 
consolidation of various administrative functions that affect enrollments (most typically the 
admissions and financial aid offices) and the creation of Vice President position for enrollment 
management (EM VP). In the discussion about internal dependency, I emphasized that the 
customers/clients play an important role in organizations being more status conscious. Indeed, 
the influence of the market has been increasing as the government gradually withdraws its 
presence in higher education. As I discussed in the adoption of EM VP positions, the 
prioritization of customers, i.e. students, has been highlighted with the penetration of the market 
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logic (Bok, 2004; Kirp and Holman, 2002). Here I focus on this particular external constituent 
group and examine how important they are to organizations, i.e., how dependent organizations 
are on their concerns about organizational status.  
 
In U.S. higher education, student enrollment contributes tuition funding to universities and 
colleges. The percentage of tuition as their source of revenue is crucial to universities and 
colleges, determining how they address concerns from this status-sensitive body of external 
constituents. Therefore, I argue that the more dependent an organization is on student enrollment 
that is concerned with organizational status, the more likely that they will be to hire top 
executive from other organizations of higher status. 
H6: Universities and colleges with strong external dependency on student enrollment 
tend to hire presidents from others of higher status more than from those of lower status. 
 
To a large degree, the spread of professional programs is similar to EM in that both are driven by 
the underlying market logic (Kraatz, 1998; Kraatz and Zajac, 1996; Kraatz and Moore, 2002; 
Kraatz et al. 2010). In these studies, professional programs are argued to have value-subverting 
innovation that has been confronted with significant resistance among traditionally liberal arts 
colleges. However, the pressure from the market or the reliance on the market has made this 
controversial practice more and more prevalent.  
 
Unlike the analysis of adoption, this research turns the focus to the scales of professional degree 
offerings to evaluate the dependency on the market. In the same logic I apply in terms of student 
enrollment, it is possible to affect an organization’s status consciousness. That is, if a university 
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of college offers more professional degrees, it is more likely to be status conscious, thereby 
hiring top executives from other universities or colleges of higher status. Therefore, I predict 
that:  
H7: Universities and colleges that offer more professional programs tend to hire 
presidents from others of higher status than from those of lower status. 
 
Peer comparisons 
According to Oliver (1991), uncertainty and interconnectedness are the two important 
dimensions to evaluate institutional pressure in the environment in which organizations are 
embedded. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 67) defined environmental uncertainty as "the degree to 
which future states of the world cannot be anticipated and accurately predicted." 
Interconnectedness refers to the density of interorganizational relations among occupants within 
an organizational field (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978; Leblebici and Salancik, 1973). As top executive hiring creates a path between 
two organizations, I here extend contextual interconnectedness to a relational dimension: the 
comparison between the origin organization where the top executive comes and the focal 
organization where the top executive goes. In this relational comparison, I focus on one key 
concept, category, to capture contextual uncertainty and interconnectedness. I first examine 
cross-category hiring in terms of Carnegie classification and control type. In order to bring 
forward the influence of contextual uncertainty, I choose to look at organizational consequences 
that are due to unexpected or uncontrollable classification rearrangements. After that, I examine 
the relational comparison in two characteristic features of organizations, size and age, in the hope 
of disentangling the forces behind the relationship between category and organizational status.  
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A category is broadly defined as “a spatial, temporal, or spatio-temporal segmentation of the 
world” (Bowker and Star, 2000: 56). Categorization, the process of making categories, is used to 
understand objects by grouping some of them together and separating them from others 
(Zerubavel, 1991, 1996). Categories are particularly important to organizations. Sometimes 
categories are “made up” by organizations when categories help them locate their competitors 
and differentiate themselves from their competitors through this self-branding process (Porac, 
Thomas, and Baden-Fuller, 1989), or when categories are used to reinforce their identities and 
protect their own niche from imitation (Swaminathan, 1999).  
 
Category and status are often studied together because they have similar organizational 
consequences, such as legitimacy. However, category differs from status as much as 
heterogeneity does from inequality (Blau, 1977). Category is more widely encompassing because 
categories at times indicate favorable or unfavorable social positions, which is similar to what 
status does. However, one of the differentiating characteristics is that while status connotes 
hierarchical comparison, category does not do so. For example, there may be no way to identify 
bowls or cups as the better or worse category of utensils, but a set of fine china probably carries 
more prestige than plain coffee mugs manufactured in large quantity. In other words, such 
comparisons of prestige between bowls and mugs are not common because I tend to compare 
bowls with bowls or mugs with mugs instead of crossing categorical boundaries. 
 
Here I argue that hierarchical standings in social status are more salient in the same social 
category than across categories. That is, the prestigious value attached to fine china is more 
! 78!
relevant in comparison to a plain dinner set than to some plain coffee mugs. Zuckerman (1999, 
2000) demonstrated that analysts are less likely to track firms whose portfolio of business lines 
does not conform neatly to those institutionalized categories. Such a lack of attention leads to 
higher cost of capital, forcing firms to restructure to fill in those categories. 
 
Cross-category hiring 
Organizational status is by nature relative, and it is more meaningful in the same category. 
Cross-category hiring mitigates the importance of maintaining status similarity and creates more 
status-driven opportunities. When an organization seeks its top executive from another category 
of organizations, it is more likely that it is motivated to achieve higher status because 
organizations in another category are not operated in similar way, even if they are of similar 
status or carry the same institutional values. Therefore, it is more likely for organizations to seek 
candidates from higher status organizations as status symbols. Meanwhile, the individual 
candidates who are willing to move from one category of organizations to another will be out of 
the social realm that they are usually in for evaluations and comparisons.  
 
In the setting of U.S. higher education, Carnegie classifications (doctoral /master’s 
/baccalaureate) and control types (public vs. private) are the simplest and most frequently used 
category measures. According to the number/percentage of their highest degree offerings, 
universities and colleges are in general divided into three groups: doctorate-granting, master’s 
(comprehensive), and baccalaureate (undergraduate liberal arts). Public universities are mostly 
funded by the government, usually the state government, e.g. University of California systems 
and even a certain part of Cornell (which is itself an Ivy League university). Private universities 
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and colleges are all privately funded through tuitions, donations, etc. For example, Stanford, the 
Ivy Leagues, and so on. The categories formed by Carnegie classifications and the control types 
provided a way to represent this diversity by grouping roughly comparable institutions into 
meaningful, analytically manageable categories. These categories also enable researchers to 
make reasonable comparisons among “similar” institutions and to contrast them with groups of 
“different” ones.  
 
According to the above discussions, the following arguments are built upon the mutual 
reinforcement of status and institutional categories on top executive hiring patterns.   
H8: All else being equal, focal universities and colleges tend to hire presidents from 
other organizations of higher status when the focal and origin universities and colleges 
belong to different Carnegie classifications. 
 
H9: All else being equal, focal universities and colleges tend to hire presidents from 
other organizations of higher status when the focal and origin universities and colleges 
belong to different control types. 
 
Rearrangement of categorization systems  
Unlike those categories developed by organizations themselves, outside categorization schemes, 
such as industry directories and university classification systems, are created by other outside 
parties (Zuckerman, 1999; 2000; Fleischer, 2008). However, these outside categories are 
important to organizational actions and decision. In this latter case, category becomes a symbolic 
institutional carrier and is a cultural-cognitive isomorphic force in the institutional field (Scott, 
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2001; Suchman, 1995). The identity, meaning, and value attached to such category are important 
in understanding its role in the field (Zuckerman, 1999, 2000; Zilber, 2002; Glynn, 2002; 
Fleischer, 2009; Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2005; Hsu, 2006; Elsbach and Kramer, 1994). 
 
Drawing on neo-institutional field-level analysis, institutional change is examined as institutional 
discontinuity at the field level. There has been increasing evidence that the effect of status is 
contingent on institutional changes in which organizations are involved (Podolny 1993; Podolny, 
Stuart, and Hannan, 1996). Institutional change at the field level creates disturbance to the 
observance of status similarity, and institutional change at the field level brings new order to 
status hierarchy, creating possibilities for organizations to elevate their status. Therefore, with a 
change in institutional continuity, organizations are more likely to hire from the other status 
groups. 
H10: Universities and colleges that have been rearranged by categorization systems tend 
to hire top executives from other organizations of higher status more than from those of 
lower status. 
 
Organizational size  
Organizational size is viewed as a peripheral component of an organization when it comes to the 
organization and its environment (Scott, 2000). Organizational size is usually indicated by the 
number of participants or the scale of an organization’s actual performance (Kimberly, 1976). 
Scholars have been debating whether a large size benefits organizations. For those who believe 
that does not, organizations that grow larger accumulate inertia as an outcome of structural 
change (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; 1989). Because more time and energy are required to 
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coordinate actions and to communicate information across large organizations, large size leads to 
increased organizational complexity (Blau, 1970; Blau and Schoenherr, 1971). And 
organizations gain inertia simply by virtue of their success (liability of smallness, where size is 
used as an indicator of success) because an organization’s members often employ routines that 
were successful in the past in novel situations where they may be inappropriate (Starbuck 1983). 
In the meantime, other scholars point out that large size confers distinct advantages. Internally, 
large organizations maintain more complex routines that support their social and economic 
fitness (Nelson and Winter, 1982). Externally, large organizations have more resources and can 
weather environmental fluctuations (Aldrich and Auster, 1986). Large organizations can even 
influence their environments directly, either by monopolizing key environmental resources or by 
exerting control over their institutional environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Nonetheless, 
research has shown that bigger is not necessarily better but that large size results in a more 
influential social position (Range-Moore, 1997).  
 
The status of an organization of small size may not be well established due to its external 
influences or social connections with other organizations. Therefore, smaller organizations are 
more anxious to establish their social positions or achieve their aspired social positions through 
linkages with other higher status organizations. Top executive hiring is one practical approach 
for them to achieve this goal. Compared with those larger organizations, smaller organizations 
are more likely to hire their top executives from organizations of higher status for social 
legitimacy and/or economic fitness.  
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It is necessary to point out that organizational size is one of the most important criteria used in 
Carnegie classification systems. If I do find hiring up patterns in cross-category relations, it is 
plausible to reason that a large size difference between the focal and the origin organizations 
may cause such an effect. Therefore, I predict: 
H11: All else being equal, it is more likely that focal universities and colleges tend to hire 
top executives from other organizations of higher status when the focal and origin 
universities and colleges have a large size difference. 
 
All in all, this chapter focuses on status concerns in the decisions of interorganizational relations. 
As noted, the important role of organizational status has been argued and supported in research. 
However, the question to which degree or under what circumstances organizations are more or 
less concerned with their status in the decisions of interorganizational relations has been largely 
overlooked or unexamined before. Following the footsteps of organizational decision-making 
theorists, the concept and model of status consciousness have been developed. In the context of 
U.S. higher education, the model is materialized into a set of hypotheses about political 
dynamics and peer comparisons.  
 
In the following section, I describe the data and targeted data sources. Also I operationalize the 
variables in my hypotheses and present an event analysis for the study. 
 
Sample and Data 
The sample is the complete population of baccalaureate or higher-degree offering universities 
and colleges as defined by Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching (1987). These 
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over 1300 universities and colleges in the sample are studied over a 20-year period, from 1987 to 
2006. I focus on top executives in these universities and colleges, i.e. presidents and chancellors, 
and their movements from one university or college to the other. The data come from separate 
sources. 
 
First, the president/chancellors are tracked with the dataset of names and titles in administrative 
positions within the U.S. higher education system. The newcomers to top positions, such as the 
Chief Executive Officer (President/Chancellor) who directs all affairs and operations of a higher 
education institution and the Chief Executive Officer within a system (President/Chancellor) 
who directs all affairs and operations of a campus or an institution as part of a university-wide 
system, are tracked for all the universities and colleges in the sample. By matching these 
newcomers’ names, titles, etc. with the people who have left their positions in the prior year(s), I 
am able to identify the origin schools of these newcomers and to establish the linkage between 
the focal and origin organization. If their names do not show up in the immediate prior year, I go 
back to the data from the year before. If this happens again, I track them up to three years back. 
However, the assumed reporting lag allowed here is three years at maximum.  
 
Second, I use data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System, often abbreviated 
as IPEDS, which is the core postsecondary education data collection program for the National 
Center for Education Statistics, which is part of the United States government. IPEDS data are 
available from 1981 and its predecessor, the Higher Education General Information Survey 
(HEGIS), dates back to the early 1970s. Both sources provide annual data on the finances, 
enrollments, faculty, curricula, and other institutional characteristics of the universities and 
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colleges in the sample. In addition to these sources, the official websites of universities and 
colleges are referred to in collecting founding year and presidential tenures throughout the 
history of each individual organization. 
 
The third data source is derived from IPEDS and specializes in financial and operational 
measures: the Delta Cost Project. It has organized data on institutional spending and revenues 
into aggregate measures of costs per student and costs per degree/certificate produced. These 
measures are developed using data from the IPEDS to allow evaluation of changes over time and 
to put information in context through comparison with patterns within other states or sectors. 
These metrics and fact sheets are likely to be most relevant to state policy makers who need to 
make decisions about issues such as funding adequacy, student tuition policies, and the relative 
cost effectiveness of existing investment patterns. The following measures are presented in the 
fact sheets per full-time equivalent (FTE) students and adjusted for inflation using the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI-U):1) Education and related (E&R) costs: includes all spending for instruction 
and student services, plus a portion of spending on academic and institutional support and for 
operations and maintenance of buildings; 2) Net tuition portion of E&R costs: is the amount of 
tuition revenues an institution takes in from students (including fees) and the net of all 
institutional grant aid provided; 3) Average subsidy portion of E&R costs: the difference 
between E&R expenses and net tuition revenue; this is the average dollar amount of E&R costs 
that is covered by institutional resources (primarily state funding at public institutions); 4) Net 
tuition share of E&R costs: the percentage of E&R expenses that is paid, on average, from net 
tuition revenues; this measure is also commonly referred to as the "student share" of costs; 5) 
Instruction share of E&R costs: the percentage of E&R expenses that is dedicated to instructional 
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spending; 6) Completions per 100 FTE Students: indicates how many completions (including 
degrees, certificates, and other formal awards) were produced for every 100 FTE students 
enrolled in the course of the academic year (this metric is not the same as the cohort graduation 
rate); and 7) Education and related spending per completion: an estimate of total education and 
related costs per completion, as contrasted to costs per student enrolled. All these data, together 
with IPEDS and HEGIS, provide the financial and operational performance of the universities 
and colleges in the sample. 
 
Fourth, the annual Peterson’s Guide to 4-year Universities and Colleges, which contains profiles 
about 1,800 four-year accredited colleges, giving enrollment, cost, admission requirements, 
financial aid, programs, campus life, and more. It is designed to help students select colleges that 
suit their needs, lists schools under several headings, including entrance difficulty, costs, majors 
and test scores. Five entrance difficulty levels are provided by Peterson’s Guide: non-
competitive, minimally difficult, moderately difficult, very difficult, and most difficult. Table 6.1 
summarizes the criteria used to assign a score to each university or college, mostly based on their 
admission rate. The entrance difficulty level captures the selectivity of college admissions and 
indicates the status of those colleges. This selectivity score is used to prove the validity and 
reliability check for the status measure of student enrollment based on geographic dispersion 
developed in this research.  
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TABLE 6.1 A SUMMARY OF PETERSON’S SELECTIVITY SCORES 
Selectivity 
Score 
Level of Difficulty to 
be Accepted  
Criteria 
0 
 
 
Noncompetitive  
 
Colleges to which virtually all applicants were 
accepted for admission, regardless of high 
school grades or test scores. 
1 Minimally difficult Most current freshmen were not in the top half 
of their high school class and scored 
somewhere below the 1010 combined on the 
SAT test or below 18 composite on the ACT 
while up to 95% of applicants were accepted 
for admission. 
2 Moderately difficult More than 75% of the current college freshmen 
from the top half of their high school class and 
scored over 1010 combined on the SAT test or 
above 18 composite on the ACT while 
approximately 85% or fewer of the applicants 
were accepted for admission. 
3 Very difficult Colleges have more than 50% for the current 
college freshmen that were in the top 10% of 
their high school class and scored over 1230 
combined on the SAT test or over 26 
composite on the ACT while about 60% or 
fewer of the applicants were accepted for 
admission. 
4 Most difficult Colleges have more than 75% of the current 
college freshmen that were in the top 10% of 
their high school class and scored over 1310 
combined on the SAT 1 test or over 29 
composite on the ACT. About 30% or fewer of 
the applicants were accepted for admission in 
this last group. 
 
 
The last data source is Carnegie Categorizations (see Table 6.2 for a summary). In 1970, the 
Carnegie Commission on Higher Education developed a classification for colleges and 
universities to support its program of research and policy analysis. Derived from empirical data 
on colleges and universities, the Carnegie Classification was published for use by other 
researchers in 1973 and was subsequently updated in 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000, and 2005. For 
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over three decades, the Carnegie Classification has been the leading framework for describing 
institutional diversity in U.S. higher education. It has been widely used in the study of higher 
education, both as a way to represent and control institutional differences, and also in the design 
of research studies to ensure adequate representation of sampled institutions, students, or faculty. 
With the 2005 revision, the single classification system was replaced by a set of multiple, 
parallel classifications. The new classifications provide different lenses through which to view 
U.S. colleges and universities, offering researchers greater flexibility in meeting their analytic 
needs. They are organized around three fundamental questions: what is taught (Undergraduate 
and Graduate Instructional Program classifications), who are the students (Enrollment Profile 
and Undergraduate Profile), and what is the setting (Size & Setting). The original Carnegie 
Classification framework—now called the Basic classification—has also been substantially 
revised. From its inception, the Carnegie Classification’s purpose has been to assist those 
conducting research on higher education. Researchers need a way to deal with the great diversity 
among colleges and universities in the United States, and classifications enable them to identify 
groups of roughly comparable institutions. The primary audience is the research community, 
including academic researchers and institutional research staff, as well as other education 
analysts. By providing a set of distinct classifications, as well as a set of online tools for creating 
custom listings (combining categories within classifications, identifying institutions in similar 
categories across classifications, or filtering listings by selected criteria), researchers now have 
much greater analytic flexibility, allowing them to match classification tools to their analytic 
needs. 
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TABLE 6.2 A BRIEF HISTORY OF CARNEGIE CLASSIFICATIONS 
Editions 1970, 1976, 1987, 
and 1994 
2000 2005 
Doctor’s 1. Heavy emphasis on 
research 
2. Moderate emphasis 
on research 
3. Moderate emphasis 
on doctoral programs 
4. Limited emphasis 
on doctoral programs 
Comprehensive 
 
1. Doctoral/Research 
Universities—Extensive 
2. Doctoral/Research 
Universities—Intensive 
1. Research Universities 
(RU/VH) (very high 
research activity)  
2. Research Universities 
(RU/H) (high research 
activity)  
3. Doctoral/Research 
Universities (DRU)  
 
Master’s 1. Colleges 
Comprehensive 
colleges I 
2. Comprehensive 
colleges II 
 
1. Master’s Colleges and 
Universities I 
2. Master’s Colleges and 
Universities II 
 
1. Master’s Colleges and 
Universities (Master’s/L) 
(larger programs)  
2. Master’s Colleges and 
Universities 
(Master’s/M) (medium 
programs)  
3. Master’s Colleges and 
Universities (Master’s/S) 
(smaller programs)  
Baccalaure
ate 
1. Liberal arts 
colleges—Selectivity 
I 
2. Liberal arts 
colleges—Selectivity 
II 
1. Baccalaureate 
Colleges—Liberal Arts 
2. Baccalaureate 
Colleges—General 
Baccalaureate/Associate
’s Colleges 
1. Baccalaureate 
Colleges-Arts & Sciences 
(Bac/A&S)  
2. Baccalaureate 
Colleges-Diverse Fields 
(Bac/Diverse)  
3.Baccalaureate/Associat
e’s Colleges (Bac/Assc) 
 
 
 
For H3, in which the ratio of faculty to administrators is proposed to be negatively associated 
with the likelihood of hiring top executives from others of higher or equal status, the expected 
sign for this hypothesis is negative. Here administrators are referred to as non-faculty, non-
academic, functional executives in university or college administration, whereas faculty 
members include full-time tenure and non-tenure track positions at universities and colleges. The 
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ratio is calculated as the total number of faculty members divided by the total number of 
administrators.  
 
For H4, the adoption of EM structure, i.e. EM VP position, is used as a proxy for the importance 
of the internal group that takes care of the customers. The expected sign for this hypothesis is 
positive so that status difference is positively associated with the adoption of EM structure. The 
adoption occurs when a college first reports the existence of an administrative position with the 
title of “Vice President for Enrollment Management.” This variable was also developed from the 
data within administrative directories. To get this measure, I went back to the earliest time of 
such adoption and coded the variable as 1 if EM structure was adopted for that year and onwards.  
 
For H5, reliance on government support is calculated using the federal, state, and local 
appropriations, grants, and contracts share of operating revenue (including net tuition; federal, 
state, and local appropriations, grants, and contracts; and private gifts, grants, and contracts). 
Status difference is negatively hypothesized with the share of government funding in the 
operation revenue of universities or colleges. That is, the higher the percentage of government 
funding is, the less status-conscious a university or college is. The expected sign for this 
hypothesis is negative. This variable was mainly derived from the Delta Project and cross-
checked with the original IPEDS data. This is a continuous measure in percentage ranging from 
0 to 1.  
 
For H6 on enrollment economy, tuition reliance is calculated as the net tuition share of operating 
revenues (including net tuition; federal, state, and local appropriations grants, and contracts; and 
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private gifts, grants, and contracts). Status difference is positively hypothesized with the share of 
student tuition in the operation revenue of universities or colleges. That is, the higher percentage 
of student tuition contribution to the operating revenue, the more status-conscious a university or 
college is predicted to be. The predicted sign for this hypothesis is positive. Again, this variable 
was mainly derived from the Delta Project and cross-checked with the original IPEDS data. It is 
also a continuous measure ranging from 0 to 1.  
 
In order to test H7, the percentage of professional degree awarded indicates the importance of 
professional programs in universities and colleges, the number of professional degrees awarded 
divided by the total number of degree offerings is calculated. A university or college is predicted 
to be more status-conscious when the percentage of professional degree offering is higher. The 
expected sign is positive. Again, it is a continuous measure ranging from 0 to 1.  
 
For H8 and H9 on cross-category hiring, two dummy variables are used. The first one is based 
on broader Carnegie classifications: research/doctoral, master’s, baccalaureate. If the focal and 
the origin university/college belong to two different groups of the above categories, the variable 
of cross Carnegie classification is coded 1 or 0 if otherwise. In a similar way, if the focal and the 
origin university/college belong to different control types, i.e. one is public while the other is 
private, the variable of cross control type is given value 1 or 0 if otherwise. !
 
For H10, Carnegie rearranged is operationalized as a dummy variable. Any university or college 
that has been rearranged to a different category in year 1994’s edition is coded with value 1 or 0 
if it remained in the same category.  
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In order to test H11, the size difference between the focal and the origin university/college is 
calculated as a continuous measure, reflecting the difference between the size of the focal and 
origin organization. Organizational size is represented by total enrollment, and the annual 
component of IPEDS collects data on the number of students enrolled in the fall at postsecondary 
institutions. IPEDS institutions report annually the number of full- and part-time students by 
gender, race/ethnicity, and level (undergraduate, graduate, first-professional); the total number of 
undergraduate entering students (including first-time, transfers-in, part-time students, and non-
degree students); and retention rates. Student enrollments are calculated as those 1) enrolled in 
courses creditable toward a degree or other formal award; and 2) enrolled in courses that are part 
of a vocational or occupational program, including those enrolled in off-campus centers; but 
excluding 3) high school students taking regular college courses for credit.  
 
Control variables 
Three groups of control variables are included in this research. The first group of controls 
includes the institutional characteristics of universities and colleges, including control and 
Carnegie classification category as described above, all in dummy variables coded 1 or 0 if 
otherwise. In addition, focal organization’s size is the total number of student enrollment. The 
reason for size control is that size is often positively associated with organizational status. For 
example, smaller organizations are more anxious to establish their social positions or to achieve 
their aspired social positions through linkages with higher-status organizations, and top executive 
hiring is one practical approach for them to achieve this goal. Lastly, focal organization’s total 
number of employees includes all full-time staff, ranging from faculty 
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(Instruction/Research/Public Service), executive/administrative and managerial employees, other 
professionals (employees), technical and paraprofessional employees, clerical and secretarial 
employees, skilled crafts employees, to service/maintenance employees.  
 
The other group of controls includes the financial and operational performance measures, 
including total operating revenue, net tuition, total degree completion and so on. The focal 
organization’s total revenue is the sum of net tuition, federal, state, and local appropriations, 
grants, and contracts, and private gifts, grants, and contracts. Net tuition revenue is the amount of 
money the institution takes in from students after institutional grant aid is provided. The total 
number of degree completions includes all that were conferred by a university or college as 
official recognition for the successful completion of a program of studies. Specifically, they are 
associate’s, bachelor’s, master’s, doctorate’s, and first professional degrees. All these above 
variables are mainly from IPEDS data and Delta project.  
 
The last group of controls is included for prior alliance relations or connections that 
organizations entered. Research has shown that organizations rely on their prior alliance 
experience to choose with whom to partner (e.g. Gulati and Gargiulo, 1999; Luo and Deng, 
2009). To find a proxy for such prior alliance partnership, this research uses whether geographic 
locations of the focal and origin organization are in the same region (Owen-Smith and Powell, 
2004).  
 
Model 
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The study examines 20 years of data from 1987 to 2006. By matching names of the newly hired 
top executives with the people who have left their positions in the prior years (up to 3 years at 
maximum), I am able to identify where these top executives come from, establishing the linkage 
between the focal and origin organization. The analysis is conducted on these events to test 
predictions about the role of organizational status and status consciousness in hiring up versus 
hiring down. In this analysis, high-status organizations have fewer higher-status organizations to 
hire up from than do low-status organizations. Meanwhile, low-status organizations have fewer 
lower organizations to hire down than do high-status organizations.  In order to address such 
ceiling and flooring effects in cross-status hiring decisions, I use the Tobit model (Tobin, 1958) 
for many of the analyses. The Tobit model, also called a censored regression model, is designed 
to estimate linear relationships between variables when there is left- and/or right-censoring in the 
dependent variable (also known as censoring from below and above, respectively). Censoring 
from above takes place when cases with a value at or above some threshold, all take on the value 
of that threshold, so that the true value might be equal to the threshold, but it might also be 
higher. In the case of censoring from below, values those that fall at or below some threshold are 
censored. The Tobit model is particularly appropriate for this study because of the flooring and 
ceiling effects inherent to the organizational status data.   
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations are shown in Table 6.3. Tobit tests of H2-H11 are 
presented in Table 6.4.   
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From Table 6.4, Hypothesis 2 is further tested in two models - Model 1 and Model 2. Model 1 
includes the dummy variables for middle and high status while Model 2 includes the dummy 
variables for middle- and low-status organizations. Universities and colleges of middle status are 
found a stronger tendency than higher and lower status organizations to hire above. Then, for 
robustness check, I ran correlation between this categorical measure and five-point measure of a 
college’s overall selectivity in admissions, which was obtained from Peterson’s Guide to 
Colleges. I also ran regression on the focal organization’s status and include a squared term to 
test the more specific argument that middle-status colleges would be more status conscious in top 
executive hiring decisions. The results from these tests all confirmed that middle-status 
organizations are more status-conscious in their top executive hiring decisions. In other words, 
middle-status organizations have a strong tendency to hire up and to avoid lower status hires in 
comparison with high and low status organizations’ hiring patterns. 
 
Model 3 in Table 6.4 tests the political dynamics hypotheses by adding the independent variables 
for hypotheses 3 through 7 to Model 1. This model reveals support for H3, which proposes that 
the faculty-to-administrator ratio has a negative influence on status consciousness.  In other 
words, the higher ratio of faculty to administrators, the less likely universities and colleges are to 
be driven by status concerns in their top executive hiring decisions. The size of the coefficient is 
rather small but the significance level has been consistently strong over the tests.  
 
However, H4 receives no support in the empirical analysis. H4 predicts that the adoption of EM 
structure, i.e. EM VP position, makes universities and colleges more status conscious. The 
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predicted sign for this hypothesis is positive. The sign and size of coefficient are both suggestive 
but the significance level is not sufficient. 
 
For H5, reliance on government supports (the share of government funding in the operation 
revenue of universities or colleges) is hypothesized to be negatively associated with status 
difference. In both Model 3 and 4, the size and sign of the coefficient are both good with 
sufficient significance level of 5% (one-tail). That means the share of government funding has a 
negative impact on the status-consciousness of a university or college. The more government 
support a university or college receives, the less likely it is driven by status concerns to hire up 
and to avoid hiring down. 
 
For H6 on student tuition reliance, status difference is positively hypothesized with the share of 
student tuition in the operation revenue of universities or colleges. The size of the coefficient is 
small, but the sign is consistent with the prediction. However, the hypothesis does not receive 
significant support.  
 
To test H7, a university or college is argued to be more status conscious when the percentage of 
professional degree offering is higher. The results accord with such prediction: the percentage of 
professional degree offerings contributes to the status consciousness of a university or college in 
their top executive hiring decisions. In Model 3, this prediction has a significance level of 5% but 
in Model 4, it drops to 10% at one-tail test. Overall, this hypothesis receives moderate support in 
the analysis. 
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Model 4 in Table 6.4 tests the categorical hypotheses (H8-H11). For H8 and H9 on cross-
category hiring, universities and colleges are predicted to be more status conscious in their top 
executive hiring decisions when the focal and origin organizations belong to two different 
categories, i.e. Carnegie Classification or control type (private vs. public). Both hypotheses 
receive support, especially when the focal and origin university or college do not belong to the 
same control type. !
 
For H10, Carnegie rearranged refers to an event in which a university or college was rearranged 
to a different category in year 1994’s edition and is coded with value 1 or 0 if it remained in the 
same category. The rearrangement by an external body creates ambiguity and misinterpretation, 
so it is hypothesized that those universities and colleges are more status conscious in their top 
executive hiring decisions. However, this prediction does not receive support from this analysis.  
 
For H11, size difference is hypothesized to prompt status consciousness in top executive hiring 
decisions. Size difference between the focal and the origin university/college here in this study is 
a continuous variable, reflecting the difference between the size of the focal and origin 
organization. In Model 4, the size of the coefficient is rather small but the significance level is 
high. A supplementary analysis using the difference between the nature log of total enrollment in 
the origin and focal university or college shows similar results, confirming the strong support but 
moderate size of the coefficient.  
 
Therefore, in the final result of Model 4, the hypotheses on middle status position (H2), faculty 
to administrator ratio (H3), reliance on government support (H5), the categorical difference 
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between Carnegie classifications (H8), control types (H9), and size (H11) are all supported. The 
hypothesis of professional degree offerings (H7) receives moderate support whereas those on 
enrollment management structure (H4), reliance on student tuition (H6), and rearrangement of 
Carnegie classification fail to do so. 
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CHAPTER 7 DISCUSSION 
In the past few decades, organizational researchers from varied scholarly traditions have devoted 
their attention to interorganizational relations. Echoing the rise of organizations being viewed as 
open systems, it is critical to understand organizational decisions through the environment in 
which organizations form relationships with one another. This vast body of research studies the 
dynamics of coordination and competition in a range of forms of interorganizational relations 
such as joint ventures, strategic alliances, interlocking and personnel flows, and so on. The most 
prominent questions that tie these inquiries together are to understand why and with whom 
organizations enter into relationships.  
 
Well-established motivations for interorganizational relations include effective management of 
interdependence and coordination, reducing risks and uncertainty, and knowledge sharing and 
transfer. Many other studies have documented how organizations obtain power and control 
resources through interorganizational coalitions and interests whereas other research has also 
shown how legitimacy is pursued and achieved in interorganizational relations. Moreover, 
scholars have developed integrating frameworks in contingency approach but their efforts often 
fail to receive empirical support.  
 
Among these efforts, one important and powerful motive, organizational status, has been largely 
overlooked. Organizational status has been found to be consequential not only to an 
organization’s performance outcomes but also to its interactions with other organizations, on an 
equal or unequal basis. As organizations position themselves through relations with others, 
organizational status has been produced and reproduced in such relations as partnership, 
endorsement, or affiliation. 
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Addressing this gap, this research has two purposes: one is to broaden the empirical basis for the 
role of organizational status in interorganizational relations, and the other important purpose is to 
integrate organizational status in the decision making process and examine when organizations 
are more or less concerned with organizational status in their interorganizational relation 
decisions. For the first purpose, this research finds top executive hiring a most appropriate 
interorganizational relation to study the role of organizational status. Empirical supports were 
established in the context of U.S. higher education. Moving onto the second important purpose, 
this research draws on decision-making theory of organizations and develops a model of status 
consciousness in the decisions of interorganizational relationship formations.  
 
Implications 
This inquiry of the role of organizational status and status consciousness in such 
interorganizational relations as top executive hiring is both important and interesting. This 
research builds upon the findings and attempts to make a contribution to contemporary 
organizational literature on interorganizational relations both theoretically and practically. 
Theoretically, it examines the general patterns of status consciousness in interorganizational 
relations, but more importantly it identifies forces that make organizations vary across situations 
or over time to be more or less sensitive to status concerns in interorganizational relations.  
 
Practically, status consciousness does not always seem to be good for organizations, though it 
may be an important force in interorganizational relations. A recent study at the individual level 
by Groysberg, McLean and Nohria (2006: 94) tracked 20 General Electric top executives who 
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moved to high positions in other companies, and concluded that those who "took over, built, or 
implemented management systems that resembled GE's were more successful," while "those who 
went to different industries, those who moved solo (rather than with a team), and those who 
joined companies whose needs (exploiting existing business opportunities as opposed to 
exploring new business opportunities) called for different skills performed poorly." Taking this 
kind of findings to the organizational level, this research focuses on status consciousness and is 
also concerned with those possible (perhaps, pathological) consequences driven by status 
concerns in interorganizational relations.  
 
This research builds upon these insights and attempts to make a contribution to contemporary 
organizational literature on status and interorganizational relations in two ways. First, it 
examines the roles of status motives or concerns in driving an empirical phenomenon that has 
not previously been studied: top executive hiring. In particular, my empirical focus is 
presidential hiring in U.S. universities and colleges from 1987 to 2006. In this research setting, 
higher education organizations are known to be status-conscious and their presidents, as top 
leaders, are status symbols. Therefore, presidential hiring becomes a strategic decision for status 
maintaining and building, and it demonstrates how status concerns play an important role in the 
process. Using a novel measure for organizational status and status consciousness, this study 
examines presidential hiring decisions in the entire population of 4-year universities and colleges 
in U.S. higher education over a two-decade period.  
 
Second, this research theoretically and empirically develops a model that attempts to explain 
under what circumstances status concerns are more or less important for strategic decisions, such 
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as top executive hiring. The underlying assumption is that organizational status is only one of the 
many motives that can come to bear on such critical strategic decisions. Drawing on decision-
making theory of organizations, this research makes an effort to understand to whom, when, and 
why organizational status matters more. In doing so, this research not only examines the 
importance of status concerns in organizations’ strategic decisions, but it also extends the 
discussion to those possible (especially pathological) consequences driven by status concerns.  
 
All in all, this research builds on the converging efforts from research both on organizational 
status and on interorganizational relations to understand organizational decision-making process. 
Organizational status scholars have realized that status is not always the only or the most 
important factor in organizational decisions (Jensen and Roy, 2008; Podolny, 1994). Research on 
interorganizational relations makes substantial efforts to integrate different types of relations and 
their motives from a contingency approach ((Brass, Galskiewicz, Greve, and Tsai, 2004; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985; Oliver, 1990; Van de Ven, 1976). This research acknowledges the findings 
from both fields and provides a new way of thinking. 
 
Limitations and weaknesses 
This study is a seminal work in exploring the role of organizational status in interorganizational 
relationship decisions. Yet, at a minimum the following matters need to be acknowledged. 
 
First of all, taking the approach of decision-making in organizational theory, the model of status 
consciousness provides an expandable, open platform for the role of organizational status in 
relations with other factors in interorganizational relationship decisions. Unlike those traditional 
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theories for exclusive and rigid predictions, this model of status consciousness in decision-
making approach is only a modest beginning for more systematic and fundamental findings. 
 
Secondly, the empirical results in this study of U.S. higher education are partial and preliminary. 
In addition, the time varying 20-year data from 1987 to 2006 were not tested as longitudinal 
panel data. The Tobit model is theoretically valid and appropriate to this study but the empirical 
testing does not work exactly the way to its advantage. Further exploration of the same 
phenomenon at other administrator levels, such as deans and department heads, may provide 
more support. 
  
Thirdly, the measure of organizational status in this research is national/international presence, 
i.e., the student drawing power over geographic locations. Although I have made every effort, 
including calculating this measure with and without international students, ensuring relatively 
high correlations between this status measure and other possible ones, and others, I do not think 
this is the perfect or best status measure. It has innate shortcomings that arise from its 
calculation. It is plausible and convincing in most cases, but it does not look reasonable in 
extreme cases. For instance, if a national university of 3000 student enrollments takes more 
students from populated states and less from remote states, it may end up with lower status score 
than a small colleges that only has 50 new students, each of whom are from a different state. 
 
The other probably more inherent limitations of this research include the positioning of this 
research between interorganizational relations and organizational status because both are unique 
but kept separately; the exploration of possible factors other than political dynamics and peers 
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comparisons to understand the decision-making process; and the generalization of this research 
to other empirical contexts and other interorganizational relations. 
 
Future Research Directions 
Possible future research directions include executive hiring that considers insiderness vs. 
outsiderness over multiple dimensions. In other words, besides the boundaries among 
organizations and status groups, it would also be very interesting to examine the usual career 
track from certain educational backgrounds, academic or functional positions, and tenure or non-
tenure experiences. It is also interesting to examine the hiring decisions at the lower level of 
administrators, such as deans, directors, and department heads. Moreover, organizational status is 
an important factor in relations with institutional logics in organizational decisions. Many recent 
developments in institutional research can also be tied to organizational status through analogy 
or in parallel. 
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